University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1964

Citizenship: Expatriation of Naturalized Citizen for
Three-Year Residence in Native Land
Constitutional
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Citizenship: Expatriation of Naturalized Citizen for Three-Year Residence in Native Land
Constitutional" (1964). Minnesota Law Review. 2802.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2802

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Case Comments
Citizenship: Expatriation of
Naturalized Citizen for Three-Year
Residence in Native Land Constitutional
Plaintiff emigrated from Germany in 1939 and became a naturalized United States citizen in 1950. Since 1956 she has resided
with her husband, a German national, in Germany. In 1959 the
United States Consulate at Dusseldorf refused to extend plaintiff's passport on the basis of section 352(a) (1) of the McCarranWalter Act,' which provides that naturalized United States citizens lose their citizenship if they reside continuously for three
years in the country of their origin. The Board of Review on the
Loss of Nationality in the State Department approved the Consulate's decision. Plaintiff brought an action alleging that she
had been deprived of her citizenship in violation of her constitutional rights? A three-judge court was convenedV The court affirmed the action of the State Department, holding that the expatriation of naturalized citizens residing continuously for three
years in the country of their birth is a constitutional exercise by
1. 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1958):

(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose
Ins nationality by(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory
of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the
place of his birth is situated

.. .

See also McCarran-Walter Act § 852(a)(2), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U..C. §
1484(a)(2) (1958), which provides that a naturalized citizen may be expatriated for residing in any foreign nation for a period of five years.
2. In 1960 plaintiff's motion to convene a three-judge court to hear her
case and declare her a United States citizen was denied by the District Court
for the District of Columbia (unreported), which decided that plaintiff had
raised no substantial constitutional issues; this action was afirmed by the
court of appeals (likewise unreported). The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for a trial on the merits. Schneider v. Rusk, 372 U.S. 224 (1963).
3. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958) and 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (Supp. IV, 1962)
plaintiff is required to bring her case before a three-judge district court where
she seeks to enjoin the enforcement of an act of Congress on constitutional
grounds.
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Congress of its power to regulate foreign affairs. Schneider v.

Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1963).4
The fourteenth amendment secures citizenship to all persons
born or naturalized in the United States;' but the Constitution
makes no provision for the loss of citizenship." Congress, however,
has traditionally recognized an individual's right to renounce
allegiance to any nation and has given legal significance to such
renunciation. 7 Congress has also felt compelled to withdraw citizenship from individuals engaging in courses of action deemed inconsistent with allegiance to the United States or likely to cause
international frictions and embarrassments." Early legislation provided that certain conduct gave rise to a presumption of voluntary repudiation of citizenship for the duration of such conduct.'
Subsequent legislation, 0 in the interest of administrative efficiency and because of a feeling that those who refuse the obljgations of citizenship should not be entitled to hold indefinitely the
privileges of such status," has provided for an automatic and
4. Cert. granted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1897); Osborn
v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
7. This traditional policy was formally enacted by Congress in 1868. REv.
STAT. § 1999 (1875). This legislation was originally undertaken to protect
persons coming to the United States who wished to break former ties with
nations who refused to recognize American naturalization. Following this,
Congress concluded a number of treaties with other nations for reciprocal
recognition of naturalization powers. See generally Maxey, Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat?, 26 ALBANY L. RIlv. 151, 158-08
(1962).
8. See McCarran-Walter Act §§ 849-57, 66 Stat. 267-72 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1481-89 (1958).
9. The first such act was the Nationality Act of 1907, 84 Stat. 1228. The
presumption of renunciation of citizenship by a naturalized citizen for residence in a foreign nation was rebutted, under this statute, upon return to
residence in the United States. See generally Roche, Loss of American Nationality -The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. Rav. 25,
38-40 (1950). For a discussion of the merits of returning to the procedure of
the Act of 1907, see id. at 71; Comment, Involuntary Loss of Citizenship by
Naturalized Citizens Residing Abroad, 49 ComrELL L.Q. 52, 78-79 (1908).
10. The Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137-74, which, with some
amendments not pertinent to the present discussion, was incorporated into
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), 60
Stat. 168, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1958), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503
(Supp. IV, 1962).
11. Such intents were expressed by the committee whose report formed
the basis of the later legislation. UNITED STATES CoAndmsE To REvmw TEE
NAmoNALITY LAWS, 76TH CONG., 1ST SEss., NATIONALITY LAws OF THE
UNITED STATES at 70-71 (Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter cited as NATIONALITY LAWS].
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irrebuttable presumption of permanent expatriation. Congress has
also expanded the list of activities that constitute voluntary repudiation of citizenship. 2 The Supreme Court has upheld such
legislation in limited instances; 13 where expatriation has been
viewed as a penalty, however, the Court, using the cruel and
unusual punishment proviso, has found it to be unconstitutional. 4
In the leading case of Perez v. Brownel, 5 decided in 1958, a
sharply divided Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a statute that expatriated citizens who voted in a foreign election."6' A majority of five, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, framed the issue to be whether expatriation for voting in
a foreign election was reasonable in the context of Congress' power
to regulate foreign affairs. The Court found that Congress might
reasonably conclude that participation by United States' citizens
in foreign elections would have an adverse effect on foreign affairs and that therefore the legislation did not violate due process.
12. Compare McCarran-Walter Act §§ 349-54, 66 Stat. 267-72 (1952),
and The Nationality Act of 1940, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168-69, with The Nationality Act of 1907, H§ 2-4, 34 Stat. 1228-29. For a discussion of the historical
view of the concept of "voluntary expatriation," see Boudin, Involuntary
Loss of American Nationality, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1511-16 (1960).
13. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Savorguan v. United States,
838 U.S. 491 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare, 289 U.S. 299 (1915). In Mackenzie
the somewhat outmoded concept of the legal identity of husband and wife
influenced the Court's decision that the wife had assumed the nationality of
her husband, even though they continued -to reside in the United States. In
Savorgnan, while an oath was the specific act causing expatriation, it was
somewhat a formality in legalizing a marriage to a foreigner. Perhaps the
significance of marriage to a foreigner no longer carries the implication of
renunciation by the wife of her identity or her nationality. The Court in
these cases more or less assumed the constitutional validity of expatriation
legislation without any thorough analysis of the basis of the congressional
power. See Maxey, supra note 7, at 171-72.
14. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), establish the rule that if expatriation is imposed
as a penalty, it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In these cases
expatriation statutes were construed as primarily penal in nature since they
were intended to punish and deter individual conduct thereby to compel
military service; this was the manifest legislative intent in the absence of any
other legitimate governmental purpose. Such an argument cannot prevail in
the instant case since the primary legislative intent was not punishment but
the regulation of foreign affairs-hence, the statute is not penal in nature.
In the present case the intent is not to control various modes of conduct by
certain individuals because Congress is not concerned with which course the
individual pursues but wishes only to protect foreign relations from the possible consequences of the various acts.
15. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
16. McCarran-Walter Act § 349(a)(5), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1481(a)(5) (1958).
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For the majority in Perez, neither subjective intent nor individual
action implying a voluntary renunciation of citizenship was necessary. Voluntariness was required only to the extent that the
individual must have acted of his own volition without duress; 17
his desires were immaterial if Congress could reasonably have
believed that under the circumstances expatriation was necessary
to implement the conduct of foreign affairs.' 8
In sharp contrast to the approach of the majority in Perez,
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for three of the dissenting Justices, argued that Congress was without power to use denationalization to implement the exercize of its general powers and without power to deprive citizens of their status. To the dissenters in
Perez, Congress' power to expatriate is constitutionally confined
to acts that manifest allegiance to a foreign state so inconsistent
with the retention of American citizenship that such acts in themselves demonstrate a voluntary abandonment by the individual
of his citizenship. Thus, for the dissenters, the test is whether
the acts upon which expatriation turns can reasonably be said
to evidence a repudiation of citizenship. The dissenters reasoned
that citizenship is so fundamental a right - "the right to have
rights""' - that it cannot be taken away without consent. Applying that test to the facts before them in Perez, they concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional because such a broad classification of conduct as voting in a foreign political election could
not reasonably be said to constitute a voluntary abandonment
of citizenship without a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the particular act.
The court in the instant case subscribed to the reasoning of
the majority in Perez and decided that there was a "reasonably
17. See, e.g., Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (no expatriation where service in a foreign army coerced); Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F.
Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (no expatriation where vote in a foreign election
coerced); see Maxey, supra note 7, at 173.
18. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57-62 (1958). There is substantial authority for the Perez majority's test of constitutionality in other areas. E.g.,
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (not arbitrary to exclude women from
jury duty); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (public
policy may interfere with individual freedom to contract); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (fixing prices as a regulation of interstate commerce). Mr.
Justice Whittaker, dissenting in Perez, claimed agreement with the premise of
the majority, but felt that voting in a foreign political election open to aliens
could not reasonably be said to constitute an abandonment of allegiance to
the United States or to be a cause of international embarrassments. Perez v.
Brownell, supra at 84-85. Whether such a view supports the majority's theory
or is more akin to the reasoning of the dissenting justices is questionable.
19. 356 U.S. at 64.
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conceivable relation" between expatriation of a naturalized citizen
residing three years in the country of her origin and the international embarrassments and frictions that Congress may seek
to avoid in its regulation of foreign affairs? 0 The court seems to
be saying that mere residence abroad for a prolonged period could
as reasonably be conceived by Congress to be a cause of international friction as could participation in a foreign political election.
Whether residence by a naturalized citizen in the country of her
origin is likely to give rise to international frictions and conflicts,
2
especially at this point in history, is at best doubtful.
Perhaps the instant court failed to distinguish factually acts
that might result in expatriation under the present statute from
acts, such as voting in a foreign political election, that might be
construed as seeking to influence the affairs of another country.
In seeking to establish the minimal relationship to foreign affairs
of the due process test, the Perez majority recognizes that it is
"not insignificant" that the conduct interpreted by Congress as
working expatriation not only imports less than complete allegiance to the United States, but some measure of allegiance to a
foreign nation that is inconsistent with United States citizenship.2 2 The committee report forming the basis of the Nationality
Act of 1940 also indicates an intent to provide for regulation of
foreign affairs designed to affect only those with a real attachment to another country and not to the United States." Since
residence abroad, in itself, does not give rise to such "dual nationality," there is little fear that two nations will make conflicting
claims on the same individual. 4 Likewise, by mere residence
20. Instant case at 312-15.
21. Compare Boudin, supra note 12, at 1524-08, with NA Iox.rLm LA.vs
70-71. The problems caused by naturalized citizens living abroad have been
described as being severe or, on the other -hand, as being do minimis. Boudin
suggests that expatriation -which leaves a person or many persons stateless
may give rise to its own serious problems. Auxey, supra note 7, at 182 states
that there is no evidence that the United States government has ever been
seriously embarrassed except in the cases of dual nationals. Comment. The
Ezpatriatio Act of 1954, 64 YAz L.J. 1164, 1173-78 (1955), seems to agree
that dual nationality is the only situation giving rise to a reasonable cause
for expatriation-not saying, however, that such expatriation is constitutional.
22. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60-61 (1958). One lower court decision
since Perez, Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 879 (3rd Cir. 1958), seems to support such a dual standard. The court ruled that a dual national by an act
declaratory of one nationality should not thereby be deemed to have renounced the other nationality. Language iimilar to that mentioned by the
majority is found in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Perez. 356 US. at 80.

23.

NATIONALITY LAWS 70.

24. However, if in addition to residence abroad the country of origin
refuses to recognize United States naturalization, the possibility of conflict
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abroad individuals do not necessarily seek to obtain the citizenship of two nations to claim the advantages of and avoid the
obligations to both; nor are they always without contacts and
loyalties to the United States. Rather, the statute is so broad
that it seeks to denationalize persons such as the plaintiff in the
instant case who have not acquired dual nationality, who wish
to retain their American citizenship, who obtained United States
citizenship with a valid intent to reside here permanently, and
who have expressed political allegiance to the United States and
to no other country.2 5 Arguably, mere foreign residence, without
any accompanying circumstances demonstrating a lack of allegiance to the United States and an allegiance to another country,
is insufficient to base fears of international embroilments.
This is so even though the statute in question is applicable
only to naturalized citizens who return to the country of their
origin and not to native-born citizens. Arguably, naturalized citizens returning to their native countries are the most likely to
establish or reestablish contacts with a foreign land. Nevertheless, there appears to be no reason why either naturalized or
native-born American citizens residing abroad would be prone to
cause the feared international conflicts by residence unaccompanied by complicating circumstances. 8
may increase due to the existence of dual nationality. The McCarran-Walter

Act § 352(a)(1), however, is not limited to the above situation; it is far
broader in that it extends to mere residence abroad without the aggravating

circumstance of dual nationality.

25. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 15-17.
26. The plaintiff in the instant case also contended that the statute in ques-

tion violated due process because it applied only to naturalized and not to
native-born citizens, thus establishing an unconstitutional classification of
citizens. The statutes considered in the earlier cases, on which the Supreme
Court had relied in remanding for trial, were applicable equally to naturalized
and native-born citizens. Although the more specific safeguard of "equal pro-

tection" under the fourteenth amendment is not applicable to the federal

government, unjustifiable discrimination is banned by the Supreme Court's

construction of due process under the fifth amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The two phrases might not be interchangeable, but
unreasonable discrimination is banned by either concept.
There is a strong tradition that the United States shall have only one
class of citizens and that no distinctions shall be drawn between naturalized

and native-born citizens. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913). Congress

seeks to justify this statute on the ground that it has been demonstrated
that naturalized citizens returning to reside in their native countries have
given rise to the greatest number of embarrassments and problems in the
handling of foreign affairs. NATONALITY LAWS 71. In Lapides v. Clark, 176
F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), the same appellate

court that affirmed the instant case went even further than it did in the
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Because of recent changes in personnel on the Supreme Court,
it is not unlikely that the minority position in Perez will be
adopted in determining the constitutionality of expatriation legislation. 7 Under that approach the statute at issue in the instant case seems clearly unconstitutional.2 8 While some acts, such
as acquiring foreign nationality, may ordinarily be construed as
evidencing a voluntary renunciation by the individual of his citipresent case by upholding a companion provision of the Act of 1940, § 404(c),
54 Stat. 1170, now The Act of 1952, § 852(a), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 US.C.
§ 1484(a)(2) (1958), which states that any naturalized citizen may be expatriated for residing in any foreign nation for a period of five years. There
seems to be even less basis for discriminating between naturalized and nativeborn citizens when residing in countries in which neither have any prior connections. See Develom ts in the Law-Immgration and Nationality, 66
HARv. L. Rv. 643, 741-42 (1953). The Supreme Court's grant of certiorani -in the instant case makes Lapides doubtful authority until the present
case is decided.
The resolution of this issue will likely turn on the outcome of the basic
due process question. Unless some special status is given to the right of citizenship, due process is not offended so long as classifications made by Congress have a rational basis-such will probably be found to exist if the
expatriation itself is found to be sufficiently reasonable under whatever theory
the Court decides -toapply. If the sanction itself proves to be reasonable, it
appears to be equally reasonable to say that persons returning to nations
with which they have prior contacts are more likely to become involved in
situations compromising their obligations to the United States. Likewise, if
the Court decides that citizenship is to be accorded a preferred status, analogous to the first amendment rights, a more stringent test would be applied
to any classification Congress seeks to make sice such preferred rights cannot be denied to certain classified individuals except where necessary to prevent immediate and grave problems. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
US. 516, 524 (1960); Hlrabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1943). Thus,
depending on which test the Court applies to citizenship, the plaintiff will
likely prevail on both the due process issue and the classification issue, orif the Court feels it necessary to reach this latter issue-on neither.
For the view that no such distinction between native-born and naturalized
citizens can be included in expatriation statutes without violating the Constitution, see Comment, Involuntary Loss of Citizenship by Naturalized Citizens
Residing Abroad, 49 CoNmr.m L.Q. 52 (1963).
27. Besides the new Justices present in this case who were not on the
Court at the time of the Perez decision, it is significant that Justice Brennan,
who joined the majority in Perez, stated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 187 (1963), that he has felt doubts concerning the decision in the
former case.
28. The relatively short consideration given to the due process issue by
Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his majority opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958), has been interpreted, even by the dissent in the instant case, as
indicating an acceptance of the majority position in Perez. See Comment, The
Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1186 (1955). But, rather, it ap-
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zenship;2 9 under the Perez dissent's theory Congress cannot implement its regulatory powers by expatriation, as was its clear intent
here, nor can it deem broad categories of acts evidence of voluntary expatriation unless it is reasonable that such acts invariably
demonstrate sufficient dilution and division of allegiance to the
United States.8 0
The statute considered in the instant case imposes expatriation for even more equivocal and neutral acts than voting in a foreign political election, which was deemed by the Perez dissenters
to be too broad a classification of conduct and too ambiguous in
nature to be reasonably construed as evidence of voluntary renunciation of citizenship." Even if the statute in the instant case
were not so broad, so that a consideration of the plaintiff's individual situation was required; if such a statute arguably evidenced
a violation of the Perez majority's due process test of constitutionality, it is very unlikely that it would survive what would
certainly be a more stringent test by the Perez dissenters.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt such a characterization
of citizenship, they might employ the restriction applied in the
protection of other basic individual rights:8 2 that Congress cannot
abridge or infringe on such rights except in the face of compelling
subordinating policies8 In light of the circumstances of the instant case, that such compelling policies are sufficiently present
to warrant the automatic application of such broad legislation is
doubtful.
Even if the right of citizenship is never accorded the sanctity
of the first amendment rights, it seems more just that such a
fundamental right, traditionally and constitutionally recognized,
pears that even a passing mention of Warren's theory in Trop, which was decided solely on the cruel and unusual punishment issue, indicates that the
due process issue is not dead; it merely indicates that because of the disagreement of the majority Justices of Perez, the Trop case had to rest on the cruel
and unusual punishment issue.
29. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958).
80. Id. at 75-77.
31. Ibid.
32. Justices Black and Douglas, in a separate dissent in Perez, specifically
group citizenship with the first amendment rights in view of its fundamental
character and its express constitutional guarantee. 356 U.S. at 82-84. Mr. Chief
Justice Warren likewise speaks of the basic nature of such a right as citizenship, which the courts are duty bound to protect from unreasonable abridgment. 356 U.S. at 64-66, 78. Other cases speak of the fundamental character
of the right of citizenship. E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Knauer
v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 677 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 167 (1943) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
33. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
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be not abridged without a more compelling reason than is found
in the act of mere residence abroad with no consideration given
to the individual circumstances, intents and purposes surrounding that residence.
ConsCription: "Supreme Being"
Test for Conscientious Objector
Exemption Violates First Amendment
Defendant Seeger sought exemption from military service on
the ground that he was conscientiously opposed to participation
in war, but he did not indicate that his philosophy was based on
belief in a Supreme Being, a requisite of the exemption statute.'
The government, although it stipulated that Seeger's abhorrence
of war was both sincere and "by reason of religious training and
belief," -° denied him exemption and indicted him when he failed to
submit to induction At his trial, defendant argued 4 that the exemption statute unconstitutionally favored objectors believing in a
Supreme Being over those objectors whose convictions were either
nonreligious in origin or were based on training and belief in a
nondeistic religion; a federal district court rejected this argument
and upheld the exemption statute5 On appeal, the Court of Ap1.

Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
ode....

Universal Mlilitary Training and Service Act § 6(j), 62 Stat. 610-13 (1948),

as amended, 50 U..C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
2. Seeger's beliefs were stipulated to be within the definition of "religious
training and -belief" adopted by -the Second Circuit in United States v. Kauten,
133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). See notes 14 & 28 infra.
3. Defendant was indicted under the Universal Military Training and
Service Act § 12, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (1958), for lmowingly
failing to submit to induction.

4. Defendant argued that he had been wrongfully drafted. It is settled

that the validity of a registrants classification may be raised as a defense in
such a case. Witmer v. United States, 348 US. 375, 377 (1955); Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
5.United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 50 VA. L.

REv. 178 (1964).
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peals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that Congress may
not consistently with the first and fifth amendments limit the
exemption to persons whose convictions arise from a belief in a
Supreme Being. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.
1964).
Congress has traditionally sought to resolve the conflict that
compulsory military service presents for conscientious objectors
by exempting such persons from the operation of the conscription laws." Although the statutory provisions designed for this
purpose have not expressly mentioned the word "sincerity," they
have implicitly exempted from military service only those persons
who claim in good faith that they are conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form 7 - administration of the exemption has been aptly characterized as a "search for sincerity." 8
In addition to requiring sincerity, Congress has always limited
the conscientious objector classification to persons whose objection
to participation in war arises from religious belief or conviction. Although Congress has experimented with the scope of this limitation,
nonreligious objectors have never been exempt. The Draft Act of
1917,10 for example, limited exemption to members of wellrecognized sects whose religious convictions accorded with the
pacifist teachings of their sect. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,11 however, eliminated the requirement of membership in a pacifist sect, replacing the objective 2 religious test of
the earlier act with a subjective standard - whether an individual's conviction arose "out of religious training and belief."
6. For a discussion of the historical development of conscientious objector
provisions in the United States, see Conklin, Conscientiouw Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 Gso. L.J. 252, 256-03
(1963); Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the
United States, 20 Gmo. WAsH. L. Rsv. 409, 412-29 (1952); Smith & Bell, The
Conscientious-ObjectorProgram- A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PirT. L. Rnv.
695, 696-98 (1958); Note, Conscientious Objectors, 36 MiNw. L. REv. 65, 70-74
(1951).

7. Smith & Bell, supra note 6, at 706.
8. Smith &Bell, supra note 6.
9. See Conklin, supranote 6, at 252.
10. 40 Stat. 78.
11. 54 Stat. 889.
12. The provisions of the 1917 act were "objective" to the extent that
they allowed an exemption upon a showing of membership in a recognized
pacifist sect. To the extent that exemption was dependent upon a finding that
an individual's beliefs were in accord with those taught by the sect to which
he was affiliated, the test must -be characterized as "subjective." Obviously,
the exemption provisions of the 1917 act were easily administered. See Mittlebeeler, Law and the Conscientious Objector, 20 ORE. L. REv. 301, 806 n.28
(1941).
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Under this standard, draft boards were required to decide whether a particular applicant's beliefs were "religious"; membership
in an organized sect was not required.
In 'UnitedStates v. Kauten'5 the Second Circuit defined the
1940 act's requirement of a "religious belief" broadly to embrace
any sincere objection to participation in war, whether that objection stemmed from a conventional religious belief or from a
personal moral code.' 4 Subsequently the Second Circuit applied
the Kauten definition of "religious belief" to permit exemption
for objectors who based their conviction on general humanitarian
concepts.'5 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, adopted a narrower
test of the religious condition imposed by the act - "religious
belief" presupposed a belief in a Supreme Being!'
In providing for the exemption of conscientious objectors under the Selective Service Act of 1948,17 Congress rejected the
Kauten construction of religious belief and, limiting the exemption, specified that "religious training and belief" meant "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation .... "8 Congress expressly excluded from the definition of religious belief
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
18. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
14.
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a
conviction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a
conscientious objection to participation in any war under any circunestances. The latter, and not the former, may be the basis of exemption
under the Act. The former is usually a political objection, while the
latter, we think, may justly be regarded as a response of the individual
to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persons
at the present time the equivalent of what has always been thought
a religious impulse.
133 Faed at 708.
15. United States en rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 Fad 845 (2d Cir. 1944); United
States ez rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
16.
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious training
and belief" is plain language, and was written into the statute for the
specific purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief,
or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based
upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher
and beyond any worldly one.
Berman v. United States, 156 F.d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946); see Waite, Section 5(g) of the Selective Service Act, as AmendeL by the Court, 209 Afam:. L.
Rav. 2 (1944).
17. 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 US.C. App. §§ 453-73 (1958).
18. 62 Stat. 619 (1948), as amended, 50 US.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).

774

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

merely personal moral code."' 9 That Congress intended to exclude
Buddhist or Taoist pacifists by employing the Supreme Being
test is unlikely; 20 Congress probably failed to anticipate conscientious objectors of those religious faiths. What Congress did intend
to achieve through the test is clear: It sought to exclude from
the conscientious objector classification persons, such as those
exempted in United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer2 ' and United
States ex rel. Reel v. Badt,22 who based their objection to war
m The Supreme Being
solely on moral grounds.2
test has not always
24
been read literally, but, perhaps because of these broad readings,
it has until now withstood constitutional attack.
In the instant case the Second Circuit, squarely facing the
constitutional challenge, found that the Supreme Being requirement unconstitutionally deprived sincere conscientious objectors
such as Seeger of the exemption.", The precise grounds for the
court's decision are unclear, but, reading the instant opinion in
19. Ibid.

20. Buddhism and Taoism axe examples of well-recognized religions that
do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of
God. See authorities cited in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11
(1961). As such, they are often cited to support the proposition that the
Supreme Being test discriminates against the substantial number of adherents
to such religions. See, e.g., 50 VA. L. REv. 178, 182-83 (1964). Absent a showing that some Buddhists and Taoists are conscientious objectors, the argument has little merit. Moreover, in light of Congress' clear purpose in adopting
the Supreme Being test, it would not seem unreasonable for the courts to disregard, or at least modify, the test when faced with a sincere Buddhist or
Taoist conscientious objector. (f. Conklin, supra note 6, at 277-78.
21. 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943); see note 15 upra and accompanying text.
22. 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); see note 15 supra and accompanying text.
23. See Note, Conscientious Objectors, 36 MniN. L. Rav. 65, 72 (1951).
24. In United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), the same
court that decided the instant case held that in order to avoid "grave and
doubtful constitutional questions," the Supreme Being test could not be read
narrowly to embrace only those who believed in the existence of a divine
personality, but must also include those who believe in "a supreme power"
of any kind. Since defendant Jakobson recognized "an ultimate cause or creator of all existence which he terms 'Godness,"' id. at 412, his beliefs were
found to be within the limits set by the Supreme Being test. But see Peter v.
United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).
25. The court apparently found only the Supreme Being requirement, rather
than the exemption as a whole, unconstitutional; a result that extended the
exemption privilege to a class that Congress explicitly sought to exclude. See
text accompanying notes 91-23 supra. To have declared the entire exemption
void, however, would have denied the exemption privilege to all objectors,
which seems even less desirable. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 518 (1958).
For a discussion of the question of "standing" raised by the posture of
the instant case, see 50 VA. L. Ray. 178, 179 n.2 (1964).
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0
light of the court's earlier opinion in Jakobson -v. United States,"
it appears that the court viewed the Supreme Being test as drawing an impermissible line between different religious beliefs, preferring "externally compelled" over "internally derived" beliefs.27
The court assumed that Congress possessed the power to implement the free exercise clause of the first amendment by allowing allreligious'objectors an exemption, but that Congress could
not exercise that power so as to "prefer" some religious objectors
over others 28 In reaching this conclusion the court relied on
Torcaso -v. Watkins2 9 a case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a section of the Maryland Constitution requiring prospective
public officeholders in that state to declare their belief in God as a
condition to assuming office. In Torcaso, delimiting what the
state and federal governments can constitutionally do, the Supreme Court stated that neither can

pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs 80

Although the language of Torcaso and other recent Supreme
Court decisions31 goes far toward precluding the classification of
individuals for any purpose on the basis of religious belief, to use
absolutely the standard suggested by the Torcaso language in the
26. 395 F2d 409 (9d Cir. 1963); see note 24 supra.
97. "[U]nder present day thinking as to the First Amendment, a statute
could scarcely be defended on this score [implementation of the free exercise
clause] if it protected 'the free exercise' of only a few favored religions or
preferred some religions over others without reasonable basis for doing so."
United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1903). In the instant
case, the court quoted the above language from Jakobson and then proceeded
to find that a distinction, consistent with the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, could not be drawn between Sakobson's "Godness" and Seege's

"goodness."
28. The court did not consider whether an exemption to all religious con-

scientious objectors would unconstitutionally "prefer" believers over nonbelievers. Indeed, under the court's concept of the variety of belief embraced
by -the word "religion" as used in the first amendment, such an inquiry would
be unnecessary. To the court, conviction arising from "conscience" is equivalent to conviction arising from "religious belief." Since a conscientious objector is one whose conscience restrains him from performing military service,

see Mittlebeeler, supra note 12, at 301, all conscientious objectors are, by
definition, "religious."

29. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
30. 367 U.S. at 495.
31. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203 (1963), discussed in Pollak,
Public Prayersin Public Schools, 77 B.Anv. L. Rnv. 62 (1963).
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context of exemption from military service seems unwise. 2 Such
an approach would require Congress to exempt all conscientious
objectors or to exempt none.8 3 This seems unduly restrictive in
light of an apparent congressional desire to implement the free
exercise clause of the first amendment by accommodating the religious convictions of at least some objectors. Although there
would seem to be no justification for conditioning the right to
hold public office on particular beliefs, a classification based on
the nature of religious belief or affiliation may be necessary to
accomplish the exemption statute's "nonreligious" purpose"the accommodation of minority religious beliefs. That Congress
hesitates to extend the exemption to all sincere objectors, or to
all sincere "religious" objectors, for fear that so broad a provision
would be subject to abuse8 5 should not be a fatal defect; narrow
limits on an exemption of this kind may be necessary. 0 Since
pacifism often arises from religious beliefs, a workable method
for ascertaining sincerity may have to be couched in terms of
those beliefs. Such a test should be permissible, even though it may
theoretically "prefer"87 some sincere conscientious objectors over
others, if it reasonably advances the statute's nonreligious purpose
by aiding local draft boards in administering the act. For example,
32. See Conklin, supra note 6, at 281, 282-83. See generally Griswold,
Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UT~n L. Rnv. 167 (1968).
33. See note 28 supra.

34. Since Congress has manifested a vital interest in providing an atmosphere of freedom for individual religious belief and practice in conformity
with the underlying policies, if not the letter, of the free exercise clause,
measures that are adopted to accommodate the free exercise of religion have
a "nonreligious" or secular, rather than a religious, purpose. See Choper,
Religion in the Public School&: A Proposed ConstitutionalStandard,47 MxrN.
L. REv. 329, 395 n.436, 400-02 (1963).

35. "In attempting to obtain a workable formula which will protect the
religious liberty of the sincere conscientious objector, the major concern of
Congress has been to enact a law liberal enough to achieve this objective, but
strict enough to discourage the coward and the shirker." Conklin, supra note

6, at 252.
36. Public support and cooperation would seem to be necessary to the
maintenance of a program of universal military training. Evidence that a
large number of insincere registrants were taking advantage of the conscientious objector exemption might lead to dissatisfaction with the system as a
whole.
37. Most implementation of the free exercise clause theoretically "prefers"
some beliefs over others. Exempting sabbatarians from the requirement of
an unemployment compensation statute that al recipients be available for
Saturday work, obviously "prefers" such persons over those who must be
available. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See generally Kauper,
Book Review, 41 TxAs L. Rsw. 467 (1962).
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since membership in an organized pacifist sect may be better
evidence"8 of sincerity than the mere assertion of pacificist beliefs,
a requirement to that effect should be permissible. 9
It does not follow, however, that the Supreme Being test is
valid. That test serves no legitimate purpose in accommodating
the rights of the minority with the need for a program of compulsory military service. The test is subjective4 0 in nature and
offers no barrier to the insincere objector, for he merely indicates
his belief and the matter is closed. 41 The persons excluded by
such religious test requirements are the sincere objectors, such
as Seeger, who refuse to compromise their belief and acknowledge
the existence of a Supreme Being in order to obtain the desired
classification.
88. Such evidence is "better" in two respects: First, .there would seem
to be more likelihood that a person associated over a period of time with a
pacifist sect is sincere in his objection to military service. Second, such evidence is easier to present and to evaluate. Although ascertaining whether a
particular individual is a "member," or is "affiliated with," a pacifist sect
might -raise some problems, those problems should be less difficult of resolution than the question whether a particular registrant should be believed.
In addition, a panel of pacifist clergymen might be assembled to pass upon
"membership" claims. Cf. Eagles v. United States ez rd. Samuels, 329 US.
804 (1946) (use of theological panels serving in an advisory capacity).
89. This is not to say, however, that such a limited exemption is necessarily wise. Experience with a similar exemption during World War I
proved quite unsatisfactory. See Smith & Bell, mpra note 6, at 690-97. But
cf. Mittlebeeler, &upranote 12, at 306 n.23.
40. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 n.9 (1961). But see Conklin, 8mpra note 6, at 279:
[T]he "Supreme Being Clause," as a test of sincerity in the Selective
Service Act, does not appear to be... intrinsically arbitrary or unreasonable. It appears to be based on a solid and workable foundation.
Congress employed this test for its objective attributes with the intention of avoiding an unrealistic, and unworkable, purely subjective test.
(Emphasis added.) Father Conklin, writing in support of the Supreme Being
test, becomes its severest critic by failing to recognize that such a test is
inherently subjective and that an insincere objector would have no qualms
about misrepresenting the nature of his religious belief.
The first of these alternatives [the formulation of a new conscientious
objector exemption requiring only a subjective inquiry into the genuineness of the claimant's objections], however, seems patently unworkable. Absent an extrasensory perception on the part of the Selective
Service examiners, a subjective test would be incapable of detecting and
thwarting an attempted avoidance of military service by those whose
objection arises only out of a desire to avoid the dangers of combat.
Id. at 281.
41. No reported case has been found where a registrant was thought to
have misrepresented his belief in a Supreme Being. Indeed, such an inquiry
might be improper. Of. United States v. Ballard, 822 U.S. 78 (1944).
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The Supreme Being test, like the religious test clause at issue
in Torcaso, cannot be justified as effecting any legitimate goal of
the statute. It is unfortunate, however, that in finding it invalid
the Second Circuit suggested that Congress either exempt all conscientious objectors, regardless of the nature of their belief or
affiliation, or exempt none. Although an exemption for all sincere
conscientious objectors would seem to be just as workable as
the present test,2 Congress may be unwilling to go that far.4"
And, if Congress were to eliminate the exemption completely, at
least some persons holding minority beliefs would be unnecessarily denied the religious freedom assured by the first amendment.

Federal Jurisdiction: Final Judgment Rule
Does Not Bar Supreme Court Review
of Interlocutory Order
Plaintiff, the receiver for an insurance company in liquidation,
brought an action in a state district court in Travis County,
Texas against two national banks. The banks filed a plea of privilege asserting that they were located in Dallas County, Texas
and were therefore immune from suit in Travis County under a
federal venue law.' The trial court denied the banks' plea. On
appeal from this order, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed; 2 the Texas Supreme Court reversed again, denying the
plea.' The United States Supreme Court reversed, three Justices
dissenting, 4 and held that the state court judgment was appealable although the merits of the main controversy had not yet
been litigated. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 871 U.S. 555
(1963).
42. The difficult determination under both -the 1940 provisions and the
present one is the determination of personal sincerity. The Supreme Being test

does not aid draft boards in making this determination. See notes 40 & 41
s-upra and accompanying text.

43. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
1. Rav. STAT. § 5198 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1958), provides: "Actions and
proceedings against any [national bank] . ..

may be had in any .

.

. State,

county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is
located having jurisdiction in similar cases."

2. Mercantile Natl Bank v. Langdeau, 331 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959).
3. Langdeau v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 161 Tex. 349, 341 S.W.2d 161 (1960).
4. Only ir. Justice Harlan dissented on the jurisdiction aspect of the
case. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion
on the venue issue.
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The Supreme Court's power of appellate review over state
court, and federal district court0 decisions has been limited by
statute, the former since 1789, 7 to "final judgments or decrees."
A judgment or decree-is not generally final unless there has been
"an effective termination of litigation,"" with nothing remaining
to be done at the trial level except ministerial acts9 or the execution of judgment.' 0 This requirement of finality avoids piecemeal
review that would often increase the expense and time of litigation.' It also restrains the Court from rendering an opinion on
questions of law divorced from the specific factual setting that a
final disposition of the case discloses.'- In addition, the fnality
requirement avoids having the Supreme Court pass on constitutional questions that might be mooted by the final outcome of a
case 8 and, where the appeal is from a state court decision, this
rule furthers the policy of minimizing potential federal-state
conflicts.4 ,
In two closely related lines of cases the Supreme Court,' rec5.28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958):

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
inwhich a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows ..... by appeal, where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant
to the... laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of
-

its validity.

,6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
7. Judiciary Act § 25, 1 Stat. 85 (1789). See generally Boskey, Finality of
State Court Judgments Under the Federal Judicial Code, 43 CoLim. L. Rm'.
1002 (1943); Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YAia LJ.
539 (1932).
8. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 72 (1940);
see St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 628 (1873).
9. Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 381 U.S. 543 (1947).
10. Catlin v. United States, 824 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
11. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
12. See Boskey, supra note 7, at 1002.
13. See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.. 62, 67 (1948).
14. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.. 1200, 124 (1945).
15. The Court rather than Congress has in fact developed the guidelines
that have given meaning to the finality rule; Congress in 1948 merely codified what was the then existing practice. The Senate Committee report noted
that "the purpose of the bill is to codify and revise [im the sense of streamlining] the laws relating to the Federal judiciary and judicial procedure." S.Rar.
No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948). The corresponding House report has
words of similar import. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1948).
Moreover, at the time the Judiciary Act was passed in 1789, there was no
recorded discussion concerning the "final judgment or decree" clause. See
Warren, History of the Federal JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HAv. L. REv. 49,

104-05 (1928).
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ognizing that under some circumstances irreparable harm might
occur in the absence of interlocutory appeal, has disregarded the
strict statutory requisite of finality.'0 The early case of Forgay v.
Conrad'7 accorded "finality" to what was in fact an interlocutory
forfeiture and sale of property order. Although such an order
could be appealed once final judgment was entered, the Court
recognized that the appellant might suffer irreparable harm if
the property were sold in the meantime.' A second interlocutory
order that the Court has cognizanced is an appeal under the "collateral order" doctrine. This exception to the finality requirement
allows an immediate appeal from the denial of a claimed personal
right that is preliminary and collateral to the main cause of action
where that right would not merge in the final judgment. If immediate review were postponed on such collateral orders, the
right to appeal would be forever lost and parties to the litigation
might suffer irreparable injury.'
In the instant case the Court seems to have carved another
exception out of the language of the finality statute. Clearly
there was no "final judgment or decree" before the Court under
a literal reading of that phrase. 0 Moreover, neither of the limited
exceptions, in their traditional sense, applied: Here, review of the
lower court's determination of venue, a preliminary order, could
have been had after final judgment on the merits with no irreparable injury, in the form of a permanent loss of a personal or property right, 2 to the litigants.
54.12-.15 (2d ed. 1953) for a
16. See 6 MooRS, FEDERAL PRACTICE
detailed discussion of exceptions to the finality doctrine both on appeals from
the state courts and from the federal district courts.
17. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
18. The Forgay case involved a decree ordering the sale or delivery of
certain physical property while at the same time ordering an accounting.
Failure to allow an appeal on the sale or delivery order because the accounting was not completed could have caused irreparable injury. Accord, Radio
Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945) (where an order was
issued providing for the immediate transfer of a radio station); Thomson v.
Dean, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 342 (1868); Kasishke v. Baker, 144 F.2d 384 (10th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 825 U.S. 856 (1945).
19. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying motion to
reduce bail); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 837 U.S. 541 (1949)
(order denying request to make plaintiff post a statutory bond to cover attorney's fees and court costs of defendant if plaintiff should lose the case).
20. A final judgment is "one that puts an end to a suit or action." BLACK,
LAw DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). Traditionally, finality requires that all aspects of the case have merged in a judgment rendered at the end of the
trial. See cases cited note 19 supra. The venue question in the instant case
was only one aspect of the current controversy and was certainly not "fimal"
for purposes of appeal.
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The Court based its finding of jurisdiction, in part, on the
authority of Local 438, Constr. Union 'v. Curry,2- a companion
case decided on the same day. In Curry, certiorari to review
a temporary state injunction against picketing was granted because there was an alleged violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority in that
case, allowed immediate review on three grounds: First, petitioner had only one defense to the injunction, that federal law
had pre-empted state court action; since this single defense had
already been denied at the time the temporary injunction was
issued, and since petitioner had no further defense to the issuance
of a permanent injunction, the temporary injunction was, in fact,
a final and appealable determination of litigation.23 This reasoning clearly can not apply to the instant case, for the merits of
the dispute had not yet been litigated. Second, the Court suggested that Curry involved a collateral order." The instant case
cannot be justified under the traditional collateral order doctrine,
however, because there has been no injury to a personal or property right. Third, the Court reasoned in Curry that the disputed
point presented a "substantial claim, ' 5 tending to uphold the
position taken by the appealing party 8
21. Although the banks might be inconvenienced by being denied an
immediate change of venue, an injury of this nature does not fit the traditional collateral order exception. The right to appeal this point would not
be lost forever; it would merge in the final judgment and could be appealed
at that time.
92. 371 US. 542 (1963). Here an employer sought injunctive relief against
picketing claimed to be in violation of the Georgia right-to-work law.
23. Accord, Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line RH., 345 U.S. 379 (1953). Mr.
Justice Harlan, who concurred in Curry but dissented in the instant case,
develops this point. 371 U.S. at 554.
24. Mxr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that the
collateral order doctrine was inapplicable in Curry because the issue involved
would merge in the final judgment and could be appealed at that time. 371
U.S. at 553.
25. 371 U.S. at 552.
26. This reasoning conflicts with Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 (1952), which also dealt with
an appeal from a temporary injunction against picketing in a labor dispute.
The Supreme Court in Ledbetter stated that in certain situations a temporary injunction might be as effective as a permanent injunction and, because
of this, appeals from interlocutory orders had been authorized by Congress
and state legislatures in some situations; in the absence of such authorization,
however, the Court could not take jurisdiction. In Curry, the majority stated
that
to the extent that Ledbetter may be said to prohibit our review of a
final and erroneous assertion of jurisdiction by a state court to issue
a -emporary injunction in a labor dispute when a substantial claim is
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The language of the instant case indicates the adoption
of the "substantial claim" test 27 as a major premise for hearing
an interlocutory appeal. The Court apparently determined subjectively that the decision below was probably wrong. Since the
major trial activity had yet to occur, the Court probably felt
it could save time and expense for both the courts and the parties by correcting the error at this point in the proceeding, avoiding the chance of reversal after a lengthy trial.2 8 If the Court
continues to use this approach, 0 there will be a major problem
in making the "substantial claim" subjective guidelines, as developed by the Court, known to litigants who are faced with the
problem of determining the most economical way to press their
claims.
made that the jurisdiction of a state court is pre-empted by federal
law . . . we decline to follow it.
371 U.S. at 552.

27. Air. Justice White stated that "nonetheless, a substantial claim ap." Instant case at 558. The Court's
reference to "appealable under state law" raises a problem: If the state from
which the appeal comes does not allow interlocutory appeal in those circumstances, is the Court prohibited from hearing it? It would seem unreasonable
that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction should depend on state law.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958) final judgments or decrees to be appealable
must "be rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could
pealable under state law, is made ....

be had .

. . ."

The analogous denial of a preliminary or interlocutory mo-

tion at the trial court level would be the highest state court "in which a
decision could be had" giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction. Cf. Thompson
v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 202-04 (1960).
28. The Court stated:
[W]e believe that it serves the policy underlying the requirement of
finality in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to determine now in which state court appellants may be -tried rather than to subject them, and appellee, to
long and complex litigation which may all be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question of venue is postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings.
Instant case at 558.
The Court also said "this is a separate and independent matter, anterior
to the merits and not enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the
plaintiff's cause of action." Ibid. Some argue that this language provided a
mechanical test of the availability of interlocutory review. See Note, The
Requirement of a Final Judgment or Decree for Supreme Court Review of
State Courts, 73 YAxi L.J. 515, 528 (1964). At least, such considerations are

an element in the Court's suggested calculus of the most expeditious way to
proceed.
29. In the recent case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962), a finality requirement was circumvented by the Court in hearing
an interlocutory appeal in an antitrust suit before the formulation of a final
divestiture plan. The relevant statute was the Expediting Act § 2, 32 Stat.
823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958), which provides for appeal
from "the final judgment of the district court" only. Although that case, like
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The Court in the instant case failed to discuss all of the policies that underlie the finality doctrine, some of which seem to
conflict with the instant result 0 The Supreme Court has traditionally sought to avoid unnecessary interference with state judicial and internal matters so as to avoid federal-state conflicts. 8 '
Here there seems to be a direct federal-state confrontation - the
Court interfered with the exercise of jurisdiction by a state court.
If this case had been allowed to come to final judgment, the
result might have mooted the Court's need to interfere. 2 More
important, however, is the fact that the Court has apparently
accepted the onerous task of deciding in every interlocutory appeal whether a "substantial claim" has been presented that
should be*decided immediately in order to save time, effort, and
expense for theparties.
the instant one, may be considered a further attack on the finality doctrine;
there are several distinguishing features that tend to weaken any effect Brown

Shoe might have. First, implementing a plan of divestiture might readily be
construed as merely ,a ministerial act; the fact that divestiture was ordered
is the important point of that litigation. Second, in Brown Shoc both parties
wanted an immediate appeal, the point of finality having been raised by the
Court itself. 370 US. at 305. Third, different statutes were involved in the
two cases: 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958), involved in the instant case, is the older
finality statute and it is backed with almost two hundred years of solid
precedent. Fourth, the fact situations are entirely different in the two cases:
In Brown Shoe the appeal came after most of the litigation had ended; in
the instant case the litigation had just commenced at the time of appeal.
Finally, it should be noted that the appellants in Brown Shoe lost their appeal in a 6 -to . decision. This does not indicate a very "substantial claim,"
a basis of the decision in the instant case.
30. These countervailing policies are not discussed in the majority opinion and they are only sketchily presented in Air. Justice Hlarlan's dissent.
They are not raised in the briefs presented by the litigants in ths case. The
Court must have been aware of them, however, since they were at least
raised by Mr. Justice Harlan, and one can only conclude that the Court has
chosen not to give them much weight. It should also be noted that the Court
avoided a ready precedent to reach a contrary result that would have been
in line with past policy. Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Snell, 179 US. 395 (1900)
also involved an appeal from a denial for a change of venue. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, reversing a state circuit court judgment, held that venue
should have been changed. Snell v. Cincinnati Street Ry., 60 Ohio St. 250, 54
N.E. 270 (1899). On appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was alleged that the state venue statute was unconstitutional. The Court unanimously held, in declining to hear the appeal, that there is scarcely an order
imaginable that does not finally dispose of some particular point arising in
a case, "but that does not justify a review of such order, until the action itself has been finally disposed of." 179 U.S. at 397.

81. See instant case at 572 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9'. This would have been the situation if final judgmeht had been
awarded to the appellants.
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Although also not mentioned by the Court, the instant case
may be justified on the ground that a refusal to review the trial
court's determination would force a national bank to appear at
a trial in a distant county.8 3 Arguably Congress intended to prevent the interruption of a daily bank business through the inconvenience of sending bank's records to a distant county. This
right to avoid inconvenience would be lost forever in the instant
case, even though the venue question would merge in the final
judgment, if the banks' only remedy is to take part in the trial
and appeal from an adverse judgment. Such a reading of the
case only slightly expands the traditional scope of the collateral
order exception to the finality rule.3
Nevertheless, by allowing an interlocutory appeal in the instant case, the Court disregarded the express wording of the
finality statute and, perhaps, adopted a "substantial claim" test.
Contrary to its oft-repeated function, the Court seems to be legislating new rules in respect to hearing interlocutory appeals.8 5
Although the finality statute is by no means dead or overruled,
as a practical matter the Court has certainly provided an opening through which that doctrine's effectiveness could be severely
limited. The Court is at somewhat of a crossroads at this point.
Perhaps the Court will view this case merely as a slight extension of the collateral order doctrine and treat it in a restrictive
38. An early Supreme Court case established that even though a national
bank is subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both the state and federal
government, the bank had to be sued at its location for purposes of necessary
convenience. As stated by that Court, the reason for the statute is to "prevent interruption in their [the bank's] business that might result from their
books being sent to distant counties in obedience to process from state courts."
First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889). However, even if the
instant Court were concerned merely with the policies underlying the venue
statute, it is difficult to justify this decision on the basis of inconvenience to
the banks. With modern methods to reproduce copies of records and with
improved travel conditions, banks are not significantly inconvenienced when
required to go from one county to another within a state. But this might be
a problem for the legislature and not for the Court. On this point see the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson,
372 U.S. 591, 594 (1963).
34. Mr. Justice White, in the majority opinion, calls the federal venue
statute "a separate and independent matter, anterior to -the merits and not
enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of
action." Instant case at 558. Technically speaking, however, there cannot be
a "collateral order" exception absent a failure to merge with the final judgment. Here the disputed venue order would have merged with the final
judgment had the case proceeded -that far.
85. As Justice Frankfurter has said:
the troublesome phase of construction is the determination of the ex-
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wayY0 Perhaps if there is a "substantial claim" test, as seems
quite likely, this will result in only another limited exception to
the finality doctrine. However, the instant case could leave the
decision on when to hear an interlocutory appeal almost entirely
to the discretion of the Court. Acting on individual cases, the
Court may well be in a better position than the legislature to determine the most appropriate time for appeal. If the Court recognizes the drawbacks of its doctrine, judicious use of the interlocutory appeal might prove to be a milestone in avoiding the
rigidity of the finality statute.

Federal Jurisdiction:
Appointment of Foreign Administrator
To Create Diversity Not Improper or Collusive
Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania domiciliary appointed administrator
of the estate of a Connecticut decedent, instituted a wrongful
death action in a federal district court against the defendants, all
of whom were Connecticut citizens.' Defendants argued that the
court lacked judisdiction because, under section 1359 of the Judicial Code,2 the plaintiff had been "improperly and collusively"
appointed to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court. Plaintiff,
admitting that he had been appointed primarily to create diversity jurisdiction,3 moved to strike the defense. The court granted
tent to which . . . external circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate
the [statutory] text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the judicial eye.
Frankfurter, Some Reftections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CowT.%. L. Pnv.
527, 529 (1947); see Lyon, Old Statutes and New Constitution, 44 CoLumr. L.

REv. 599 (1944). Certainly the Court has become increasingly "less formal in
the matter of final judgments." Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543,
546 (1947).
36. See text accompanying notes 33 &34 supra.
1. Decedent sustained fatal injuries when a bulldozer backed over him.
The vehicle was owned by defendant Elm City Construction Co. which had
leased it to defendant Savin Brothers, Inc., whose employee was operating it.
A death action accrued within CoNN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 52-555 (1958), which
allows an executor or administrator to recover from the party legally at fault.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958).
3. The decedent's mother, a Connecticut domiciliary, was originally appointed administratrlix but she resigned and 1laintiff was substituted in her
stead. Plaintiff-administrator had no personal relationship with the decedent,
nor with the decedent's family, nor with any of the beneficiaries. Counsel for
the -heirs of decedent advised the substitution of plaintiff because of his foreign citizenship. Plaintiff candidly explained that the primary motive was to
obtain the requisite diversity to invoke -the jurisdiction of the federal court.
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plaintiff's motion and held that the appointment of a foreign administrator in order to create diversity is neither improper nor
collusive within the meaning of section 1359. Lang v. Elm City
Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.' 1963). 4
Congress has provided that controversies between citizens of
different states that involve more than $10,000 are cognizable in
the federal courts.' In determining whether a controversy is between citizens of different states, the federal court looks to the
citizenship of the real party in interest0 - the person who, under
the applicable state law, has both a judicially enforceable right
and control of the action.' In the instant case, under Connecticut
law, plaintiff-administrator was the proper person to seek judicial
relief in his own name and he was in control of the action.8 His
citizenship, therefore, was controlling for purposes of diversity.
Diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited, however,
by section 1859 of the present Judicial Code, which provides that
there shall be no federal jurisdiction of a case in which a person
4. Aff'd per curiam, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).

5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
6. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931); County of
Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961); O'Donnell v. Hayden Truck
Lines, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 823 (D. Conn. 1945); see 2 BARuON & HoLTzorF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 482, at 31 (Rules ed. 1961); 3 MoonE,
FaDERA PRAcTicE
17.04 (2d ed. 1963).
Not every federal court has looked to the citizenship of the real party in
interest. See Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); Fallat
v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp.
594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 8 STAN. L. REv. 469 (1956). Diversity jurisdiction can,
on this authority, be found if a party with the "capacity to sue" is diverse.
For example, a nondiverse incompetent rather than his foreign guardian may
be regarded as the real party in interest. Nevertheless, diversity could be sustained on the guardian's citizenship if he has the capacity to sue.
7. See Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904); Moore, Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problem, Raised by the Preliminary
Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 564 (1987); Simes, The Real Party in Interest, 10
IKy. LJ. 60, 61 (1921). See generally 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra
17.02; Clark & Hutchins, The
note 6, § 482; 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 6,
Real Party in Interest, 34 YAsE L.J. 259 (1924).
The real party is not necessarily a person for whose ultimate benefit the
action is allowed. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: II
Pleading and Parties,44 YAx LJ. 1291, 1310-12 (1935). Not every interested
person, nor necessarily the person having the legal title, is a real party in
interest. Simes, supra at 61.
8. See O'Donnell v. Hayden Truck Lines, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 823 (D. Conn.
1945); Hartford & N.H.R.R. v. Andrews, 36 Conn. 213 (1869); Prates v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (Super. Ct. 1956);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 59-555, 52-106 (1958).
9. See 2 BARRON & HoLTzoF?, op. cit. supra note 6, § 482; HART & WECnSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTmV 917 (1953); MOORE, op.
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has been "improperly or collusively" made a party to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court.'0 The language of section 1359 is substantially the same' as that used in the corresponding section of
the 1940 Judicial Code, section 80. As construed by the courts,
section 80 did not prohibit all attempts to create diversity by
maneuvers of the parties. Thus, reincorporation of a nondiverse
corporation in a foreign state to create diversity succeeded in that
purpose if the local corporation was dissolved.' 3 Section 80 was
only applied to withhold federal jurisdiction where the creation
of diversity was feigned, fraudulent, or colorable." Thus, reincorporation in a foreign state failed to create diversity where the
former corporation remained to control the new one and to demand the judgment proceeds.' 5 Under section 80 the crucial issue
was not motive, rather it was whether diversity of citizenship in
fact resulted from the maneuver of the parties or whether the
alleged diversity was feigned.'8
cit. supra note 6, at 1313 & n.8; Cohan & Tate, Manufacturing Federal Diversity Jurisdictionby the Appointment of Rereentatives, 1 Vru.. L. 11REV.

201, 212-13 &nn.67 & 68 (1956); cf. Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 US. (11 Wall.)
172 (1870); Childress v. Emory, 17 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642, 669 (183); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 US. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958): "A district court shall not have jurisdiction
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court."
11. See Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791, 794 (D.P.R. 1951); Revisor's
Notes, H-R. BR. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1359 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as Revisor's Notes]; HART & WhcsLtm, op. cit. supra note 9, at 918.
12. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472; reenacted as Act of
Marc 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 37, 36 Stat. 1098 (then codified as 28 U.S.C. § 80
(1940)). The relevant provisions are:
If in any suit . . . in a district court... it shall appear ... that the
pa-ties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for .the purposes of creating a case
cognizable ... said district court shall proceed no further therein, but
shall dismiss ....
13. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
14. French v. Jeffries, 149 FQd 555 (7th Cir. 1945); Ikeler v. Detroit Trust
Co., 39 F. Supp. 371 (ED. Mich. 1941). The terms "feigned" and "colorable"
were used in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928).
15. See Miller & Lux, hic. v. East Side Canal & Irr. Co., 211 US. 293
(1908); Lehigh Miming & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 US. 327 (1895).
16. Compare Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 US. 518 (1928), twith Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895). Compare Williamson v. Osenton, 232 US. 619
(1914), with Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.. 315 (1889). But see Cerr v. AkronPeople's Tel. Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914) (appointment of a foreign
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By substantially readopting the language of former section 80,
Congress apparently intended that section 1359 should restrict
diversity jurisdiction in the same manner as section 80.17 Section
1359 does not, therefore, withhold federal jurisdiction where, as a
matter of strategy, diversity is intentionally created, if the maneuver in fact makes the controversy one between citizens of different
states; 8 the intention to create diversity does not alone render
the appointment of a foreign administrator improper or collusive
in violation of section 1359.19 On this interpretation the court in
the instant case correctly decided that plaintiff's appointment
was not collusive or improper within section 1859 because, as a
result of the appointment, the controversy was in fact between
citizens of different states.2 0
The result in the instant case, however, raises the question
whether section 1359 sufficiently limits diversity jurisdiction.
Where diversity of citizenship is created solely for the purpose of
invoking the federal judiciary, no reason or need can be advanced
for federal jurisdiction.2 ' Traditionally, diversity has been deadministrator to create diversity held collusive). It seems, however, that such
later cases as Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933), Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S.
518 (1928), and Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1936) limit the Cerri
case to its facts. See HRT & WEcHSLER, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 918-19.
Moore asserts, based on the Cerri case, that the prohibition of collusion and
impropriety prevents founding diversity on a manipulation of the real party
17.05. This interpretation was
in interest. 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 6,
rebutted by Jaffe v. Philadelphia & W.R.R., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
17. See authorities cited note 11 supra.
18. See HART & WECHSLER, Op. ct. supra note 9, at 918-19.
19. McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954).
20. See County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1961);
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 787 (3d Cir. 1959).
21. See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 896-97. In the instant
case, plaintiff expressed the reasons for creating diversity as follows:
[It is] in the best interests of the decedent's estate . . . because of
the enlightened rules of practice in the Federal Courts, because of the
uniform excellence of the judiciary in this district and circuit, and,
finally, because the jury selection system used in this court has resulted
consistently in the seating of intelligent jury panels.
Instant case at 875 n.4. See also 8 ELLIOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES 533
(1901) (comments of James Madison); 7 HAMILTON, WoasK 764 (1851); Frank,
HistoricalBases of the FederalJudicial System, 13 LAW & CONT'P. PROD. 3,
27 & n.27 (1948). The plaintiff's argument, that the federal courts are more
capable of administering justice, is an insufficient reason for removing a category of cases arising under state law to a collateral court system. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTENIP. PROB. 216, 239-40 (1948). Instead, attempts should be made to
improve state judicial deficiencies. Compare Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 60 (1954) (concurring opinion). But see Frank, For Main-
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fended on the ground that foreigners need protection from prejudice in state courts. 2 Federal cognizance of the instant case cannot be supported on that ground, however, since in the absence
of federal diversity jurisdiction there would not have been a
diverse party involved in the controversyP In addition, the foreign administrator did not need federal protection, for only the
beneficiaries and the defendants, all of whom were local, could
be financially prejudiced.2 4
Also supporting the withholding of federal jurisdiction is the
argument that the appointment of a diverse administrator in a
wrongful death action is more analogous to other types of controversies excluded by the policy of section 1359 than to those
not excluded. For example, if a local corporation purposely dissolves and reincorporates in a foreign state or if a person intentionally changes his domicile, federal diversity jurisdiction is
created;25 but if the owners of a local corporation merely give
a cause of action to a foreign corporation that they control or
if a person merely changes residence intending to return, diversity is feigned2 In other than wrongful death actions, this distaning Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 Y&

LJ.7 (1963). The author argues that
diversity jurisdiction should not be "drastically cut" because it serves to dis-

pose of many cases and it has educational value in experimentation between
the two systems. However, these benefits could still exist even if diversity
were defined with the sole objective of protecting foreigners in state courts
22. This theory was advanced by Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 9 US. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). See Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 US. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); AwxacAri LAw BanrTUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISIoN or JuimsIcTIoN BmVNr
STATE AD Fr mAL
CoURTs S6-44 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963); HART & WEcH.ER, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 892-93; Frank, HistoricalBases of the FeddralJudicial System, 13
LAw & CoNTmw. PRoB. 3, 22-28 (1948); Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 RAnv. L. Ruv. 49, 83 (1923).
23. "Devices both for obtaining and avoiding the diversity jurisdiction
are to be condemned as opening and shutting the federal courts on grounds
entirely unrelated to the basis of the doctrine ....
" 44 HAv. L. Rtsv. 97,

100 (1930).
94. Although the administrator may recover damages for injuries resulting in death, Cow. Gra. SuT. Rzv. § 52-555 (1958), he is acting in a representative capacity only, since the damages are ultimately for the benefit of
decedents heirs, CoNrN. GEx. STAT. RFv. § 45-280 (1958); it is the heirs, not
the administrator, who could be prejudiced.
25. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 US. 518, 524 (1928); Williamson v. Osenton, 232
U.S. 619 (1914); Curb & Gutter Dist. No. 37 v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 902, 906

(8th Cir. 1940).
26. See diller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Ir. Co., 211 US. 293
(1908); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. v. Kelly, 160 US. 327 (1895); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 US. 315 :(1889). See also Steinberg v. Tore, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.PII.
1951); Ikeler v. Detroit Trust Co., 89 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
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tinction seems to have been applied to exclude cases in which
persons have sought advantage by creating federal jurisdiction
while maintaining their right as local citizens to receive the
award from the federal court.2 7 Creation of diversity in a wrongful death action, by appointment of a foreign administrator, is
equally abusive of federal jurisdiction even though in form the
parties are diverse. Looking beyond the mere form of the action,
determinable local beneficiaries are seeking diversity and yet
remaining as ultimate recipients of the award.2 8 Even though the
foreign administrator is in fact the real party, such a maneuver
is analogous to the feigned and collusive cases.
A solution to this problem is not easily formulated. Although
the federal courts might alter the application of the "improperly
or collusively" clause so as to exclude cases in which diversity
has been intentionally created, 0 such an interpretation would be
contrary to the legislative intent. Congress, however, could withhold jurisdiction of any civil action in which a party attempts
to intentionally create federal diversity jurisdiction.80 This proposal would withdraw federal jurisdiction of cases, such as the
instant case, for which no valid reason can be given for granting
jurisdiction. Since it is the motive to create diversity that seems
abusive of federal jurisdiction, such an intent test would require
the federal courts to inquire into the motive, in the facts of the
27. See id. at 372.
28. Under Connecticut law, the administrator is the proper party to enforce the substantive right, O'Donnell v. Hayden Truck Lines, Inc., 61 F.
Supp. 823 (D. Conn. 1945), and he may sue the persons at fault without joining the beneficiaries, CoNN. GEN. STAT. Ray. § 52-555 (1958). Notwibhstanding this, the award from a wrongful death action is not an asset of decedent's
estate, Harris v. Barone, 147 Conn. 233, 158 A.2d 855 (1960), but is destined
for the statutory heirs of decedent whether the administrator is local or foreign, CoNr. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-280 (1958).
29. See Cerri v. Akron-People's Tel. Co., 219 Fed. 285 (NJ). Ohio 1014);
3 MooaE, op. cit. supra note 6,
17.05 ("the real party in interest rule may
not be manipulated for the purpose of founding jurisdiction"). Moore reaches
this conclusion by reasoning that 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958) does not preclude
inquiry into motive and that it should be improper or collusive, within that
provision, to make or join a party for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction. See also Cohan & Tate, supra note 9, at 215-16, 244.
30. Compare H.R. REP. No. 2832, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., (1963), printed
at 109 CoNG. REc. 1108 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1963). This bill, introduced by
Congressman Celler, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, is designed "to
withdraw from the district courts jurisdiction of suits brought by fiduciaries
who have been appointed for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship."
See also the proposal by Cohan & Tate, upra note 9, at 245: "The District
Court shall not have jurisdiction of a Civil Action in which any party, by
assignment, appointment or otherwise, has been made a party for time purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of such court."
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instant case, for the appointment of an administrator 3 Such an
inquiry would cause difficulties in proof and administration and
thereby renders this proposal somewhat impractical.m
Another possible solution to this problem would be for Congress, with respect to wrongful death actions, to replace the real
party in interest test. Under that test the citizenship of the representative is determinative.3 Arguably, it is the ease with which
a foreign administrator may be appointed that has fostered the
intentional creation of federal jurisdiction 4 If the determinative
citizenship for purposes of diversity were that of the beneficiaries,
it would be more difficult to create diversity3 3 This proposal has
other merit. If the rationale of possible prejudice against foreigners in state courts is accepted as the basis for diversity jurisdiction3 8 then that jurisdiction should be defined in terms of
the citizenship of persons who might be prejudiced. It should be
recognized that the administrator will not be injured by prejudice because, although he is bringing the action, it is not for his
benefit.3 7 Similarly, the "citizenship', of the estate or the decedent
should not be relevant since the award is not for either's benefit.8 8
31. In the instant case the administrator admitted the motive; in the
face of a federal policy against intentionally creating diversity, however, it
may be supposed that adroit counsel would not admit that motive. Cf. In
re T aufman's Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 401 (Phil. County Orphans' Ct. 1954),
130 LEGA, I NT3GwCER 529.
32. It seems likely that the difficulty in proving motive is one reason
the federal courts refuse to examine collaterally the motive for the appointmeat of a representative. Consider, for example, Afecom v. Fitzsinmons
Drilling Co., 284 US. 183 (1931) and authorities cited notes 19 & 20 supra.
33. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
34. See Akxymc LAw INsTrrur, op. cit. supra note 22, at 47; Annot.,
75 ALR.2d 718 (1961).
35. For diversity to exist, none of the beneficiaries can be a citizen of
the same state as any of the defendants. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806). Nevertheless, a beneficiary could change his citizenship
or assign his interest, but ,this would not be as easy as the appointment of a
foreign representative.
36. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
37. In the instant case, the three defendants and the ultimate beneficiaries were all Connecticut citizens. In looldng beyond the form of the action
to the facts and events essential to the controversy, it seems that these persons are 'the primary and essential persons in the case. The defendants and the
beneficiaries, not the administrator, are financially affected by the judgment.
38. The proceeds of the action will not be assets of -the estate. Harris v.
Barone, 147 Conn. 3, 158 A.2d 855 (1960). They are destined for the heirs
of decedent. CoN-. GEN. STAT. Itv. § 45-080 (1958); cf. Luck v. BMinneapolis
St. Ry., 191 Minn. 503, 254 N.W. 609 (1934). Compare 30 Mca. L. Pxv.
1341 (1931).
The AMERm cA LAw T1hsTrruTE, op. cit. supra note 22, §§ 1301(c), 1302(d)
recognizes that the major basis for diversity jurisdiction is the possibility of
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A wrongful death action is for the ultimate compensation of injured statutory beneficiaries. Therefore, since they are the parties
who might be prejudiced, their citizenships should be determinative. 9

Criminal Law: Confession After Illegal Arrest
Not Excluded by Fourteenth Amendment
Appellant was illegally arrested' at 2:80 a.m. and held by the
police for six hours prior to being questioned concerning a clothing store burglary. After a half hour of interrogation, appellant
signed a transcript of his verbal confession admitting the burglary. At trial he conceded that his confession was voluntary2 but
objected to its admission into evidence because it was obtained
during a period of detention following his illegal arrest. On appeal
from his conviction for burglary and grand larceny, the Maryprejudice against, or inferior justice dor, foreigners in state courts. It proposes that diversity should not be withdrawn in areas where this possibility
still exists. Its solution to the problem of intentional creation of diversity,
however, is to impute 'the citizenship of the decedent to the representative.
Id. § 1301(c). The ALI also provides that a representative may not sue if
the individual represented could not have sued at the time the events occurred. Id. § 1301(d). This solution to the problem does not seem to be responsive to the basic policy underlying diversity. In the instant ease the
award for wrongful death did not become an asset of the estate. See authorities cited supra. If the basis for diversity is the possibility of fairer or more
just adjudication for out-of-staters in a federal court, then that jurisdiction
ought to be defined in terms of those who may be prejudiced. In a wrongful
death action this would seem to ,be the statutory beneficiaries, not the estate.
39. It could be argued that in a situation in which the statutory beneficiaries were defined as the heirs of decedent, the proposal would require the
federal courts to hear an issue within the forbidden area of probate and administration. If this argument has merit, a standard could be adopted whereby only the jurisdictional question is determined; that is, the beneficiaries
need only to be determined to a "legal certainty," not conclusively. Cf. Bell
v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238 (1943).
1. The court apparently wanted to reach the issue of the admissibility of
a voluntary confession following an illegal arrest. On appeal the prosecution
argued at length that the appellant's arrest was legal. Nevertheless the court.
without deciding the issue on its merits, held the arrest illegal on the basis
of an admission by the prosecutor not appearing on the trial record. See Brief
for Appellee, pp. 3--7, Prescoe v. State, 191 A.2d 226 (Md. 1963).
2. By this concession appellant undoubtedly waived -his right to object to
its admission on grounds of involuntariness; that one represented by competent counsel can waive constitutional objections to the introduction of
evidence is settled. See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 196 (1955);
Martelly v. State, 231 Md. 341, 348, 187 A.2d 105, 108-09 (1963); 9 WIamorm,
EvmFNcn §§ 2588-92 (3d ed. 1940).
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land Court of Appeals held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments do not require that a voluntary confession made during a
period of detention following an illegal arrest be excluded from
evidence. Presecoev. State, 191 A.2d 226 (Aid. 1963).
That the fourth and fourteenth amendments require state and
federal courts to exclude tangible evidence obtained through an
illegal search, seizure, or arrest is now well-established. 3 By with-

drawing the evidentiary usefulness of illegally obtained evidence,
the exclusionary rules are intended to deter the police from future
misconduct as well as to protect the individual's right to privacy.
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Common-law evidentiary rules do not permit objection to evidence on
the ground that it was illegally obtained, because those rules are based on the
reliability of evidence and the illegal acquisition of evidence does not necessarily weaken its reliability. See McCormcx, Evmu.xcE 291 (1954); 8 WIGEvsDEsmc § 2183 (3d ed. 1940). In order to safeguard the fourth amendment's individual guarantee against police intrusion, see note 4 infra, the
Supreme Court, in Weeks v. United States, supra, excluded evidence obtained
through unconstitutional police activity; the Court later expanded this rule
to exclude derivative as well as direct physical products of an illegal search,
seizure, or arrest. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Notwithstanding the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the states continued to admit illegally obtained evidence. See Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 224-392 (App.) (1960); 8 WiGoan, EvmnxcE § 2181 n.1. The Supreme Court had recognized in 1949 that "the security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is the core of the Fourth
Amendment" is implicit in fourteenth amendment due process and binding
on the states, Wolf v. Colorado, 838 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); but more than a
decade was to elapse before the Court held that due process also required
state court exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of a violation of this
protection, Mapp v. Ohio, supra. See generally Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, in 1961 SuanM CoUnT IEvImW
1 (Kurland ed.); Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v.Colorado, 41 N.
L. Itnv. 185 (1961); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Year. Later: Illegal State
Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 4S MmqNv. L. hav. 1083 (1959).
4. It has been said that the "core of the right to privacy is the protection
of the integrity of the individual, and if the home is to be inviolate against
unreasonable searches, it is because this is one way of protecting that integrity. No one stays in his home all or even most of the time, and one does not
leave one's Tight of privacy behind merely because one steps out of doors."
Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. R v.16, 41-42 (1957).
The fourth amendment confers, "as against .the Government, the right [of
the individual] to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, 3., dissenting). See also Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, in 1960
SusnEm COURT REviEw 46, 47 (Xurland ed.); Kamisar, Illegal Searches or
Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements. A Dialogue an a
Neglected Area of CriminalProcedure, 1961 U. Irm. L.P. 78, 91.
moa,
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These rules, by abrogating judicial sanction of constitutionally
violative evidence, also preserve and enhance respect for the judicial system and the law.5
In applying the constitutional exclusionary rule, however,
courts have distinguished between physical and verbal evidence,
excluding the former but admitting the latter where obtained
through a fourth amendment violation.0 Admissibility of verbal
evidence, such as a confession, has been determined solely under
the time-honored "voluntariness" test,7 regardless of whether it
5. Beyond the principal reasons for the rules discussed in the accompanying text, the courts have suggested that the rules protected the offended individual and prohibited the government from benefiting from its own wrong. E.g.,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963); see I.amisar, eupra
note 4, at 92-93; 57 CoLum. L. REV. 1159, 1164-70 (1957). But see Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 389 n.49
(1964).
6. The great weight of state and federal authority has made this distinction. Kamisar, supra note 4, at 91.
Three decisions, relied on by the Supreme Court in Wang Sun v. United
States, see notes 14-20 infra and accompanying text, illustrate exceptions
from the general refusal to apply the constitutional rule to the verbal products of an illegal search or arrest:
In Neuslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940), the
court excluded testimony of officers concerning incriminating statements of
the defendant made to them after they had illegally entered his home, However, the reception of this early expansion of the exclusionary rule to verbal
evidence was cool, and the case was "not seldom distinguished." MAGURE,
EViDENcE OF GUILT 188 n.24 (1959).
In McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1955) the court
excluded oral testimony regarding physical objects seen in the course of an
illegal search, finding no basis of distinguishing between such verbal evidence
and the introduction of the objects themselves.
The Supreme Court, in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1901),
excluded testimony concerning defendants' incriminating conversations overheard by the testifying officer who had illegally entered defendants' home
and installed a secret microphone.
Unlike the majority of state courts, the New York courts could see no
difference between physical and verbal evidence resultant from fourth amendment violations, and they excluded confessions of the defendant as the fruit of
the poisonous tree. The New York Court of Appeals excluded defendant's
confession made after he was confronted with objects illegally seized from
his home in People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 286, 183 NXE.2d 651, 655,
299 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357 (1962). In People v. Chazanoff, 288 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d
Dept. 1963), the defendant was illegally arrested; at the same time papers
were illegally seized from his shop. The court excluded his admission made
at the time of the arrest and seizure as "the product of the unlawful search
and seizure" without specifically stating whether the illegal arrest and/or the
confrontation with the illegally seized papers was the operative cause of exclusion. Id. at 994.
7. Because confessions were considered inherently untrustworthy, the
common law developed the voluntariness test to weigh their admissibility.
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followed a fourth amendment violation. In determining whether
a particular confession was "voluntary," the courts have considered, along with other factors, an illegal arrest and subsequent
unauthorized detention, but absent more abusive police techniques such misconduct has not rendered the statements inadmissible.'
Inasmuch as the fourth amendment addresses itself to tangibles, "persons, houses, papers, and effects," it is understandable
why this would not be a basis for excluding intangible verbal
evidence.9 Another and more sophisticated basis for admitting
confessions that follow an illegal arrest is that the causal chain
or essential connection. between the illegality and the verbal evidence was broken by the voluntary act of the accused who, in
effect, waived his right to object to the invasion of his privacy.10
As one commentator has described it:
The unlawfully arrested suspect could keep his mouth shut but could
do nothing about the seizure of items on his person or in his presence.
See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 (1961); Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); McCoeRcn, EvmExcE 231 (1954); 3 WIomron,
EvmDEqcE § 822, 823(b), (3d ed. 1940); Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary"
Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogations

and Confesions, 17 RuTras L. lv. 728, 742-43 (1963). Today, "abhorrence

of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their
inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as -from the actual criminals themselves.' Spano v.
New York, 860 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); see Rogers v. Richmond, 305 U.S.
534, 544 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US. 199, 206 (1960); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219,236 (1941).
Although to -beadmissible as "voluntary" a confession must be "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker," it need not
be an outpouring of his conscience but only free from physical or psychological coercion and overpersuasion by -the police. Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 US. 568, 602 (1961); see, e.g., :MAoura, EvmENcE oF GumT 121-33
(1959); McCoR.ICK, EvmENcn 231-32 (1954); 3 WIGMOnE, EvmW.xCE § 838
(3d ed. 1940).
8. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316
US. 547, 552 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 US. 227, 238 (1940); see
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 737.
9.

The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things
person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of

-the

-the warrant necessary to -make the proceeding lawful, is that it must

specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (dictum); see IAGmWUE,
EvIDENcn OF GUILT 188-89 (1959); Kamlsar, supra note 4, at 124-28.

10. See Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 Pad 929 (1955) (en
bane); Kamisar, supranote 4, at 128-38.
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And if he chose involuntarily to blab it was his fault, not that of the
arresting officers.?1

The Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States 2 introduced a
further refinement when it held admissible intangible verbal evidence obtained by an unwarranted seizure of a telephone conversation; this evidence was admissible because it was not preceded
by a trespass and because it was intangible. The Olmstead doctrine was, as a result of the courts' failure to recognize that there
8 extended to all confeswas no precedent trespass in Olmstead,"
sions that followed an illegal search and seizure.
In the recent case of Wong Sun v. United States14 the Supreme
Court departed from the traditional physical-verbal distinction
and excluded oral statements, regardless of their voluntariness,
when made closely following an illegal entry and arrest.", In that
case federal narcotics officers at an early morning hour entered
the home of James Toy, chased him into his bedroom and illegally
arrested him. At that time Toy made self-incriminating statements. He also made statements that led to the illegal arrest of
Wong Sun, who made no incriminating statements when arrested.
Several days after being told at proper arraignment of his right
to withhold information and to obtain counsel, Wong Sun, of his
own volition, returned to the officers and confessed to his part in
the narcotics violation under investigation. Although both confessions were preceded by an illegal arrest, the Supreme Court,
reversing the Ninth Circuit,'0 excluded that of Toy and admitted
that of Wong Sun. The Supreme Court's opinion contains strong
language 7 indicating that the distinction between physical and
verbal evidence is no longer sound. Dwelling on the "oppressive
circumstances" surrounding Toy's arrest and confession, the early
morning forceful entry and chase into his bedroom, 8 the Court
excluded his statements at least because they were not "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the un11. Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NED. L. Rv.
483, 519 (1963).
12. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13. See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 123-28.

14. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
15. Id. at 485-86. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, author of the
Wong Sun majority opinion, in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 460
(1968) (dissenting), reaffirming application of the exclusionary rule to verbal
evidence. See also Broeder, supra note 11, at 519; 31 GEo. WAsHi. L. Rav.
851, 851-52 (1963).
16. Wong Sun v. United States, 288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961).
17. 371 U.. 471, 485-86 (1963).
18. Id. at 486 n.12.
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lawful invasion."' 9 Since the Court was not required to resolve
the more difficult question - whether a confession should be excluded absent oppressive circumstances- its opinion is limited
to situations involving "oppressive circumstances." Emphasizing
that Wong Sun had been away from the police for several days
on his own recognizance and had been informed of his legal rights
at his arraignment, the Court admitted his confession because
"the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint [of illegality'."2 0
The majority in the instant case too readily assumed that
Wong Sun left state laws dealing with illegal arrests unaltered."
The Supreme Court in Wong Sun based its decision on the fourth
amendment; that decision is therefore binding on the states
through fourteenth amendment due process.2 The absence
of reference to the "voluntariness" rule eliminates that test as
the basis for the exclusion in Wong Sun. One passage in Wong
Sun suggests by implication that the exclusionary rule therein
rests with the Court's supervisory power over the federal judiciary a but other statements of the Court outweigh it. For ex19. Id. at 486.
20. Id. at 491, quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 841 (1939).
21. Instant case at 231.
Because the instant court assumed the arrest of the appellant was contrary to Maryland law and unconstitutional, it avoided the interesting question of what, if any, freedom the states have within the constitutional exclusionary rule to set standards of illegality of search and arrest. The Supreme
Court in the recent case of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 3 (1963) intimated
that although the states are not bound by federal statutes they are, at least,
bound by the minimum "fundamental criteria" of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments as spelled out by the Court. This would leave the states free to
set more stringent standards of legality ,but would bind them to the Supreme
Court's minimum. This result was anticipated by several state courts and
writers. E.g., Belton v. State, 228 Md. 17, 178 Aed 409 (1962); Commonwealth v. Spofiord, 180 NYE-2d 673 -(Mass. 1962); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d
368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961); Allen, supra note 3, at 46;
Broeder, supra note 11, at 205; Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-MAan's
Land in the Criminal Law, 49 C.A . L. lv. 474, 503 (1961). Before Ken,
several states concluded they had freedom to set standards within the rule.
See, e.g., Leveson v. State, 188 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1962); Wyatt v. State, 77 Nev.
490, 367 Pad 104 (1961); State v. Chance, 71 NJ. Super. 77, 176 A.2d 307
(Sup. Ct. 1961). This position was supported by several writers. E.g., Collings, Towa'rd Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-An Amicus Curiae
Brief, 50 CraF. L. REv.421, 442 (1962); Traynor, Mapp v. 074o at Large in
the Fifty States, 1962 Dunm Li. 319, 327; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for
Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 Rocmy MT. L. lRtv. 150
(1962).
22. See note 3 supra.
23. In support of its conclusion, supra note 15, that the policies of the
exclusionary rule do not justify a verbal-physical evidence distinction, the
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ample, the Court's decision to exclude Toy's statements begins
by emphasizing the traditional physical-verbal evidentiary distinction under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 4 In
addition, by relying on the same decisions that it earlier used to
ground the rule in Mapp v. Ohio on the Constitution 2 the Court
affirmatively suggested that it was the fourth amendment exclusionary rule that required the abolition of the distinction between
physical and verbal evidence. Furthermore, by emphasizing the
non-constitutional basis of the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary
rule 26 when it contrasted that rule with the abrogation of the
physical-verbal evidentiary distinction, the Court negatively
Court spoke in terms of the federal system and relied on two cases resting
on the Court's supervisory power over the federal judiciary and not on the
Constitution:
Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214, or of closing the doors of the federal courts
to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained, Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 ....
371 U.S. at 486. (Emphasis added.) However, it must be remembered that
Wong Sun itself was a federal prosecution.
24. 871 U.S. at 485.
25. Wong Sun relied on the following cases: Silverman v. United States.
865 U.S. 505 (1960); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1885) (predecessor of Weeks). Mapp, in turn, relied on Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra; Weeks v. United States, supra;
Boyd v. United States, supra. 367 U.S. at 646-48. See Broeder, supra note 11,
at 558.
26. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943); Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452-53 (1957).
Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an
accused be brought before a United States Commissioner "without unnecessary delay."
(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an
arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner ....
FED. R. Cnvm. P. 5(a). The rules themselves provide no sanction against
violation of the prompt arraignment protection, and they often were abused
before the Supreme Court in McNabb-Mallory required exclusion of any evidence obtained during detainment made illegal by failure to arraign promptly.
The McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule explicitly rests on the Court's supervisory power over the federal judiciary rather than on the Constitution.
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951); Lyons v. Oklahoma, $22 U.S.
596, 597 n.2 (1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). Although the rule is not a constitutional requisite,
the Michigan Supreme Court adopted it per se to implement a similar state
prompt arraignment statute in People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102
N.W.2d 738 (1960).
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implied that the abrogation of this distinction was constitutionally based 7
Although neither the voluntariness test nor the constitutional
exclusionary rule required exclusion of an otherwise voluntary
confession simply because it followed a fourth amendment violation,"3 Wong Sun expanded the constitutional rule to make some
such confessions inadmissible. Since Wong Sun dealt with the
polar situations of a confession contemporaneous with the invasion of privacy and one made several days after the invasion with
an interim of freedom, it did not specifically reach the situation
presented by the instant case. Even though the line drawn by
Wong Sun is unclear,29 the instant court should have excluded
Prescoe's confession. To the extent that Wong Sun rests on coercive pressure, the illegal entry into Prescoe's home exerted upon
him a relatively strong pressure to confess 0 Of course, Prescoe's
27. 371 U.S. at 486 n12:
Even in the absence of such oppressive circumstances, and where an
exclusionary rule rests primarily on non-constitutional grounds [the
McNabb-Mallory rule], we have sometimes ....
28. See notes 6 &8 supra and accompanying text.
29. See Kamisar, Book Review, 76 HAnv. L. IRv. 1502, 1509 (1963). Wong
Sun may go all the way and require exclusion of all statements of the accused
following his illegal arrest before -his release from custody. See Broeder, supra
note 11, at 526-32. It may require exclusion of statements made following an
illegal arrest before the accused has consulted with counsel or before he has
been informed of his right to remain silent. See Xamisar, supranote 4, at 138.
It may require exclusion only until the illegality ceases "to be an operative
and effective cause of the confession." Instant case at 237 (dissent). Or it
may xequire only exclusion of statements made -before the "oppressive circumstances" surrounding the illegal invasion have ceased. See Broeder, supra note
11, at 521--24.
The instant case illustrates the hesitancy with which the Wong Sun case
broadened individual protection at the expense of police power will be received by the courts. See also State v. Xeating, 61 Wash. 452, 378 Pr2d 703
(1963). Compare the hesitancy with which state courts adopted the original
rule excluding physical evidence. Note 3 supra. The development of the
McNabb-Mallory rule, see note 26 supra, provides a more dramatic example
of a trial court's hostiity toward any expansion of the protection of the accused. Lower lederal courts seized language in McNabb qualifying its general
rule excluding oral admissions made during detention illegal because of unreasonable delay in arraignment and, in effect, rendered the rule without substance. The Supreme Court reinstated the rule with Mallory, but litigation
over its limiting language continues. See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Maallorj
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale& Rescue, 47 GEo. LJ. 1, 5-6, 17-20 (1961).
The nation's prosecutors resist more emphatically such an expansion of
the rights of the accused. Consider this view as represented by In.u & REID,
CRIM1NAL INERROGATION AMD CONFESSIONS (1962).

30. A man is much more likely to confess after being confronted with

illegally seized physical evidence than he is after being illegally arrested. Sini-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

six-hour stay in jail lessened the probable causal relation between
the illegality and the confession;3 1 unlike Wong Sun, however,
in the longer period between his illegal arrest and confession
Prescoe was not notified of his right to remain silent, was unable
to consult with counsel, and was unable to consider his actions
out of custody. The absence of affirmative ameliorating official
conduct that would have insured Prescoe's "freely and intelligently given"3 " waiver of objection to the prior illegal arrest suggests that the mere passage of time in jail was insufficient to make
the confession admissible.
Furthermore, admission would frustrate and exclusion would
further the policy considerations underlying the exclusionary
rule. 3 By admitting petitioner's confession the instant court
sanctioned his illegal arrest and missed an opportunity to remove
one incentive for making such arrests34 - the hope of procuring
a confession.3 5
larly, he is more likely to confess if his illegal arrest is accompanied by an
unauthorized and forceful entry into his home than if he is peacefully but
illegally arrested. See Broeder, supra note 11, at 529.
31. The federal prosecutor charged with enforcement in the nation's capitol, who bears the brunt of McNabb-Mallory, has said that "in some very
high percentage of the cases a confession is made if it is going to be made at
all, within an hour or two, perhaps three hours after arrest." Hearings on
HS. 7525, S.486 Before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1964). Therefore, to the extent that an illegal arrest
in oppressive circumstances draws out a confession, its causal effect is dissipated considerably during the six hours that followed arrest in the instant
case. On the other hand, it is ridiculous to argue that mere passage of time
would purge the illegality -because that would encourage further police illegality and achieve the anomolous result of helping the police with further
illegality. Rather, in order to purge their illegality the police must adopt a
positive approach by informing the prisoner of his right to counsel and of
his right to remain silent and by arraigning him. Moreover, since most interrogations are initiated upon arrest and in the instant case appellant was held
incommunicado for six hours and confessed within a half hour after interrogation, it would seem that his confession would fall within the time indicated
by the federal prosecutor for the District of Columbia.
82. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951); see Jolmson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1988). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 891, 489
(1968); Emspak v. United States, 849 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1955); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 889, 898 (1987); Hodges v. Easton,

106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).
83. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
34. For reasons other than the formal conviction of offenders underlying
police arrests which would remain unaffected by an exclusionary rule, see
Allen, supra note 3,at 87-38.
85. Although arrests on mere suspicion without probable cause are unconstitutional, great numbers of arrests are made on this basis in the hope of
obtaining incriminating statements during the illegal detention. See Douglas,
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Criminal Law: Defendant Allocated
Burden of Persuasion on Entrapment
Defendants, having been indicted for bribing1 and for conspiring to bribe' an internal revenue agent, defended on the
ground that they had been entrapped by the government. At
trial, defendants objected to the judge's instruction to the jury
that the burden of proving governmental inducement was on the
defendants and that the prosecution could rebut such evidence
by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had
been predisposed to commit the crime.3 On appeal from their conviction, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and
held that it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury that the
defendants had the burden of proof on inducement without specifying the quantum of proof required; the defendants needed only
to prove inducement by a preponderance of the evidence. Garin
v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1963).
Entrapment is a relatively new criminal defense 5 that at least
partially reflects the attitude that a person encouraged to commit
a crime by enforcement officials should not be punished.' Quite
Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YAL LJ. 1, 12-13 (1960); Kamisar,
Book Review, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1502, 1506-07 (1963).

1. 18 US.C. § 201 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) (Supp. IV, 1963).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
3. The defendants contended that entrapment is analogous to insanity:
that while the government need not offer evidence to dispute entrapment in
its case in chief, once the defendants come forward with substantial evidence
of entrapment, the burden is on the government to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See text accompanying note 20 infra.
4. Cert. denied, 374 US. 829 (1963).
5. The first federal case discussing the defense was United States v. Whittier, 28 Fed. Cas. 591 (No. 16688) ,(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878). However, the defense
was not successfully asserted in a federal court until 1915. Woo Wai v. United

States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
The question of instigation of crime by enforcement officials has not
squarely arisen in England. W=Aars, CIUMIIW, LAw § 256 (2d ed. 19061).
6. See, e.g., Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878): "Human nature
is frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement in wrong-doing. If we
cannot assist another and prevent him from violating the laws of the land,
we at least should abstain from any active efforts in the way of leading him
into temptation." See also Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in tihe Federal
Courts, 90 U. PA. L. 1REv. 245,263 (1942).
There has been little discussion concerning a test for determining who is
a government agent, although paid informers and persons acting under a
promise of immunity have usually been treated as such. See Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,60 YALE
LJ. 1091, 1109 (1951).
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naturally, the assertion of entrapment as a defense increased
markedly in the early decades of this century after the passage of
liquor and narcotics control laws, which required greater dependence on undercover techniques because of the lack of complaining victims.1 Although appellate courts often recognized the doctrine of entrapment, they failed to agree on a rationale: Some
decisions were attributed to "estoppel" s or public policy;' but
most courts simply found entrapment if government officials had
brought about the commission of the crime, unless the officials
had some grounds for believing that the defendant was predisposed to violate the law and had merely presented him with
another opportunity to do so.10
The Supreme Court did not formally accept the doctrine
of entrapment until 1932 in Sorrells v. United States;" even then
a split in the Court as to the rationale underlying the entrapment
defense prevented clarification of the "test." A majority of the
Court in Sorrells conceded that the government may afford an
opportunity for the commission of a crime, but thought that the
government may not induce an "otherwise innocent" person to
commit a crime. The Court, rejecting public policy as a basis
for entrapment, rested the defense on the judicial power to avoid
unjust results foreign to a statute's purpose. Under the majority
test, evidence of the defendant's past behavior would be admis2
sible to show that he had been predisposed to commit the crime.'
7. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458 (1932).

8. E.g., O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931), where prohibition agents originated a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act and the court held that the evidence conclusively established an estoppel
against the government.
9. E.g., Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589, 591 (10th Cir. 1934); Butts
v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921). In Butts the court reversed a
conviction for refusal to instruct on entrapment and described the conviction
as "unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established law of
the land ...
." Id. at 38.
10. See, e.g., De Mayo v. United States, 32 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1920);
United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.). Ga. 1925); De Long v. United
States, 4 Fd 244 (8th Cir. 1925). For recent consideration of this question,
see Whiting v. United States, 821 F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 1963); United States
v. Clarke, 224 F. Supp. 647, 658-60 (ElD. Pa. 1963).
11. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A federal prohibition agent posing as a tourist
visited the defendant in his home along with three area residents. The agent
learned that he and the defendant were veterans of the same World War I
division, and they reminisced about war experiences. During the conversation
the agent asked the defendant if he could get some liquor; after three requests the defendant left and returned shortly with one-half gallon, was paid
$5.00 by the agent, and was arrested.
12. The majority test has been criticized on the ground that it allows
inducement of those not "otherwise innocent" and that it undervalues the
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In contrast, the concurring minority in Sorrells contended that
the foundation of entrapment is not statutory construction, but
the duty of the courts to protect the "purity" of the judicial process by refusing to sanction unconscionable governmental conduct
that creates crime to secure convictions. They believed that the
focus belongs on trickery or fraud by enforcement officials and
that evidence of predisposition should be irrelevant.
In 1958 the Court divided along the same lines in Sherman v.
3 The majority
United States.P
supported jury decision of the entrapment issue and reiterated the view that the defendant should
only be acquitted if the criminal act arose from creative activity
of the government rather than the predisposition of the defendant.
The separate opinion of the minority contended that the reasonableness of police suspicions and the predisposition of the accused
are irrelevant, because permissible enforcement activity does not
vary with the defendant or police suspicions.
Regardless of the rationale used, 4 the test enunciated by the
majorities in Sorrells and Sherman still applies. For a defendant
the most important questions concerning the test are, first, whether entrapment will be decided by a jury that will hear prejudicial
evidence on predisposition 5 and, second, the allocation of the burfact that exoneration is allowed because government agents led the person
from -his innocence. MoDEL PmA CoDE § 2.10, comment (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1959); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA.
L. REy. 871, 897-903 (1963). The test has also been assailed as an inadequate
control on police methods -because police might view it as a trial defense
only. Rotenberg, supra at 899. The most prevalent disagreement with the
majority position is that if predisposition may be shown by past crimes and
reputation, the court and not the jury should be the trier of fact on the issue
because it is less likely to be led from the issues or prejudiced by such evidence. See Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and
Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. Cnmx. L., C. & P.S. 447, 452 (1959);
Donnelly, supra note 6, at 1108; Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and
Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 Fonnnr t L. REv. 399, 411,
417 (1960). But see Note, 73 E.Anv. L. Pxv. 1333, 1348-44 (1960).
13. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
14. The entrapment defense in practice is justified in terms of public
policy; the federal courts have ignored the majority basis of statutory construction, unless an implied exception to the particular statute is tacitly asslmed -by the courts. See Donnelly, supra note 6, at 1110. The minority rationale has not been expressly accepted, but the cases seem to describe the
availability of the defense in terms much closer to that position.
15. Accardi v. United States, 257 Fad 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1958) states
that "'predisposition' means something more than 'disposition' and is intended to refer to the character and intentions of the accused as an 'unwary
innocent' (if the conviction is reversed) or as an 'unwary criminal' (if conviction is affirmed)." Before submitting the issue to the jury, however, courts
examine both predisposition and police conduct to determine if there was
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den of proof.' As to the second question, Judge Learned Hand
laid down a commonly used formulation of the Sorrells test: The
accused has the burden of showing that he was induced by an
agent to commit the offense, and the government has the burden
of showing that the accused was ready and willing without persuasion and was awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit
the crime.' 7
Judge Hand's allocation of the "burden of proof" did not settle
the question of whether the defendant's burden was that of production or persuasion or both. 8 Nor, if the defendant has the
entrapment as a matter of law. Walker v. United States, 285 Fad 52 (6th
Cir. 1960); Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960). Entrapment can be found as a matter of law "where the evidence points to only
one conclusion . . . just as any other factual issue admitting of only one
conclusion," United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1957),
and it has been so found where government officials used tactics which offended "common concepts of decency," Badon v. United States, 269 F-d 75,
80 (5th Cir. 1959), or which were "inordinate inducements," Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958), or "extraordinary temptations,"
Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1955).
16. The instant court stated that the defendant may admit his crime or
require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed it and in either case invoke the entrapment defense. Instant case at
654. See also note 27 infra. This choice may not, in practice, be available if
the jury also decides the entrapment issue. It would often be immaterial,
where considering probable prejudice, whether the defendant has just the
burden of introduction or must also prove inducement by a preponderance because in either case he probably will have to take the stand and subject himself to impeachment by evidence of any prior convictions. See McCoumiIc,
EVIDENCE § 157 (1954). Even if the defense can produce the requisite evidence
without putting the defendant on the stand or if the prosecution raises the
issue by its evidence, the prosecution still may present the defendant's prior
convictions to show predisposition. If the defendant is to have the aforementioned choice, unless the judge decides the issue or the inquiry is limited
entirely to the asserted impermissible police conduct, it would seem to be
necessary first to require the jury to find that the prosecution has proved
the commission of the crime, and if it did, only then to hear the evidence
on predisposition after the entrapment defense is invoked.
17. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952).
18. Many cases say only that the defendant must prove inducement. See,
e.g., Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Kivetto v.
United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935 (1958).
One district court, however, construed the defendant's burden to mean that
of going forward with the evidence while the government retained the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Silva, 180 F.
Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
Stating that the accused has -the burden on inducement does not indicate
whether inducement means the objective invitation or the subjective effect on
the accused. See Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1344 (1960). A recent case,
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burden of persuasion on inducement under the Sorre/!s test, did it
decide whether the burden must be overcome by a preponderance
of the evidence, by clear and convincing evidence, or by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt?9 Judge Hand's formulation of the
Sorrells test is helpful, however, in that it indicates that inducement (police conduct) and predisposition (defendant's character
and prior record) are both considered in determining whether the
defendant is responsible for the crime. Since evidence of predisposition is in rebuttal of the claim of inducement, it seems clear
that there is actually only one issue and one burden of persuasion.
While it is undisputed that the defendant has the burden of introduction on inducement and the prosecution has it on predisposition, the allocation of the burden of persuasion is not apparent.
In the instant case, the defendants argued that it was error
to place the burden of persuasion as to inducement on them, contending that, as in the case of insanity, they had only to introduce substantial evidence of entrapment. In addition, the defendants argued that even if they did have the burden of persuasion
on inducement, the instruction given was prejudicial because the
only measure mentioned was too heavy. The court agreed with
the appellants that they had the burden of going forward with
evidence on entrapment. The court, however, believed that the
location of the burden of persuasion for an insanity defense is
different from that for entrapment because entrapment does not
negate an essential element of the crime, but requires acquittal
only by reason of an overriding policy against instigation of crime
by enforcement officials? ° According to the court) although the
prosecution must prove all essential elements of a crime, a person
seeking relief on the grounds of entrapment should be required
to prove the inducement justifying his acquittal by a preponderciting Accardi, see note 15 supra, stated that once governmental inducement
has been shown, the government must establish that its conduct was not
shocking or offensive per se and that the defendant had not, in fact, been corrupted by the inducement. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76 (1st
Cir. 1968).
19. These measures are best defined in terms of probabilities. See McConmucK, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 319, 820; McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees
of Belief, 32 CiArn. L. Ruv. 242 (1944); MeNaughton, Burden of Production
of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HAnv. L. ltv. 1382
(1955); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 EHnv. L. BEv. 59, 64-68 (1933).
20. This treatment of entrapment is common. The test applied is that of

the Sorrells majority, but the statutory construction argument that the defendant had not committed a crime is ignored, apparently in favor of the
Sorrells minority's public policy rationale. See Donnelly, supra note 6, at 1110.
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ance of the evidence. 2' Therefore, the instant court held that the
trial court's failure to designate the quantum of the burden on
inducement was prejudicial error because the only measure mentioned was that of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
If the majority rationale for the test in Sorrells is the law,
"non-entrapment" probably should be considered an essential
element of the crime;2 the burden of persuasion would then
be on the prosecution since in federal criminal cases the government must prove every essential element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 3 Following this view, the instant
court's allocation of the burden of persuasion on inducement to
the defendant would be erroneous. If the minority rationale for
the Sorrells test is the law, however, the prosecution would not
necessarily have the burden of persuasion on entrapment, because
under that rationale the defense is regarded as being based on
facts extraneous to the actual guilt of the defendant.2 4 The instant
court clearly followed the apparent trend toward acceptance of
the minority basis for the Sorrells test,25 which would not require
21. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 19062); id. §
2.10, comment at 20--21 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
22. The Sorre!!s majority noted that the practice had been to view the
defendant as not guilty if entrapped; it rejected the view that the defense
was analogous to a plea of pardon, i.e., that the accused was not denying his
guilt, but setting up special facts in -bar. 287 U.S. at 452. On the other hand,
the words "otherwise innocent" of the majority -test seem to indicate that the
invocation of the defense presupposes the commission of an act ordinarily a
crime. The federal courts often state that the defense assumes the crime
charged was committed. E.g., Marko v. United States, 314 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1963); Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961) (dicta); Rodriguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955).
23. United States v. McKenzie, 801 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1962). The higher
measure required in criminal prosecutions is justified by the fact that consequences to the life, liberty and reputation of the defendant may be more
serious from a criminal than from a civil conviction. McConmicK, op. cit.
supra note 16, § 321. The requirement of a "presumption of innocence" is just
another method of expressing the measure of the prosecution's burden of
persuasion on the entire case, although it hopefully serves as a caution to
the jury to consider only the evidence. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed.
1940). The same is true in most state criminal cases. See McConMIcK, op. cit.
supra note 16, § 318; 9 WwmoRE, op. cit. supra § 2512. But see note 26 inlra.
24. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932). Even if the
prosecution were given the burden of persuasion under the minority rationale,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not necessarily be required because
"non-entrapment" would not be an essential element of the crime.
25. See note 14 supra. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Tent. Draft No. 9.
1959) listed what was essentially -the minority view as the alternative formulation of the definition of entrapment; the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) now defines entrapment in accordance with what
previously was the alternative formulation.
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the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the prosecution. For
instance, the court rejected the defendant's analogy to the insanity defense on the ground that sanity is an essential element
in a federal criminal case,2 while entrapment assumes that the
crime charged was committed 7 and justifies acquittal despite that
fact.
In considering the allocation of the burden of persuasion on
collateral issues in criminal cases, it may be helpful to resort to a
consideration of civil cases because in most criminal cases the
courts merely give a cautionary statement that the prosecution
has th6 burden of proving guilt by the criminal standard. In civil
proceedings the party having the burden of pleading a fact usually
has the burden of first producing evidence and the burden of persuasion 8 This is true because it is usually fair to require one who
seeks to chanige the status qio to show justification.20 But there
26. Satterwhite: v. United States, 267 Fad 675 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This is
not true in many state courts. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the
Supreme Court'held'that a statute requiring the defendant to prove his insanity beyoiid a reasonable doubt did not. violate due picess. Only Oregon
requires this, but some twenty states require the accused to prove his insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence.. Id. at 798. This requirement is allegedly
because the insanity defense is disfavored on policy grounds; the entrapment
defense, 'however, af least under the minority view, is available precisely because it is favored on policy grounds.
27. E.g., Marko v. United States, 314 Fad 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1963);
Ramirez v. United States, 294 Fad 277, 283 (9th Cir. 1961) (dicta). This
does not mean that the defendant cannot plead inconsistently, for this has
ordinarily been permitted in criminal as well as in civil proceedings. See Love
v. State, 16 Ala. App. 44, 75 So. 189 (1917) (alibi and absence of requisite
intent); Stalling v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 310, 234 S.W. 914 (1921) (alibi and
commission of act while unaware of the circumstances). Also, it does not
mean that a denial of the crime and the assertion that if some acts were
found to have been committed, they were the result of entrapment are necessarily inconsistent. Hansford v. United States, 303 Fa2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1902)
(two-fold defense that defendant did not make the sale of narcotics, but if
sale did occur there was an entrapment, not inconsistent). See Henderson v.
United States, 237 F2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Washington,
20 Fad 160 (D.C. Neb. 1927). But cf. Coronado v. United States, 260 Fa2d
719, 721 (5th Cir. 1959). There may be an appearance of inconsistency, but
the better view is to allow both claims because the defendant should not be
required to forego his right to have the prosecution prove the commission of
the acts charged in order to assert the entrapment defense. See Note, 73
HARv. L. Env. 1333, 1343 (1960); 70 HAnv. L. EV. 1302, 1303 (1957).
There is not even an apparent inconsistency if one says that the trier of fact
must first find that the crime charged was proved by the criminal standard.
If the trier of fact does so find, then entrapment exonerates the accused even
though the crime charged was committed.
28. McCon Iac, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 307, 318.
29. Morgan, supra note 19, at 81. One writer maintains that it is a funda-
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is no general rule for allocation of the burden of persuasion in

civil cases except that of fairness.80 Such a rule should be equally

applicable to collateral issues in criminal cases. When requesting
that he be relieved of the consequences of his act because of police

inducement,8 the defendant is in the position of a plaintiff in a
civil action, 2 and he should be required to prove his assertion to
justify his acquittal.m A balance must be struck between the
requirements of law enforcement and the rights of the individual;
the government cannot be allowed to manufacture crime in order

to enforce the law, but enforcement must be possible in practical

terms.34 Therefore, assuming the minority rationale for the

Sorrells test is followed, the allocation of the burden of persuasion
on entrapment to the defendant appears to be desirable.

Corporations: Nominal First -Option Agreement
on Closely Held

;Shares

a Reasonable Restraint

Plaintiff was a party to a family stock-transfer agreement
which provided that in the event one of the parties died or desired
to sell his stock, the other parties had a first option to purchase
it at a price of one dollar per share.1 Following the death of one
of the parties, plaintiff-optionee tendered the decedent's execumental requirement of any judicial system that a person who desires a court
to take action must prove his case to its satisfaction. Cnoss, EVEN cE 74
(1958).
80. McConancx, op. cit. supra note 18, § 318; 9 WiamonE, op. cit. npra
note 28, § 2486.
81. Had the "entrapper" been a private individual, there is little question
that the defendant would be guilty and the entrapment defense would not
be available to him. See Donnelly, supra note 6, at 1108-09.
32. See MoDEL PErNAL CODE § 2.10, comment at 20-21 (Tent. Draft. No.
9, 1959).
83. Professor Williams indicates that the reason the burden of persuasion
sometimes is shifted to the defendant is the idea that on certain issues it is
impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence, so that it
is fair for the accused to be required to give evidence on these issues if he
is to derive a benefit. This does not always mean that the 'burden of persuasion on the issue passes to the accused. WilLAms, TnE PnooF or Gu=ir 1 8
(2d ed. 1958).
84. The dilemma exists because the laws that inherently result in violations
generating no complaints by witnesses or victims are within the criminal law
and must be enforced. One writer, advocating prosecution of entrapping officials, rejected the "necessary to enforcement" argument as one formerly used
to justify torture. Mikell, supra note 6, at 264.
1. Plaintiff was one of four family members who -had incorporated a business and divided the issued stock among themselves. They subsequently
entered into this agreement, which replaced an earlier agreement stipulating
a price of 850 per share.
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tors the stipulated dollar per share. When the tender was refused,2
he sought and was granted specific performance of the agreement.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed and held
that the agreement did not create an absolute and unreasonable
restraint on alienation and it therefore would be specifically enforced. Mather Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
Thd most common restraints on stock transferability are "firstoption" restrictions, which provide that upon the holder's death
or his decision to sell, either the corporation or other shareholders
have a preemptive right to purchase his shares Such restrictions
have become an almost indispensable feature of close corporations.4 American law with respect to the validity, and enforceability, of first options, however, has developed upon the presupposition of a public policy against restraints on stock alienation
The policy assumes that the maximum beneficial use of property
is possible only where property is freely alienable0 In some situations, however, free alienability tends to frustrate the maximum productivity of closely held shares,7 therefore, restrictions
deemed to be "reasonable" are valid The "reasonableness" test
2. At the time of defendant's refusal the stock's book value exceeded $400
per share and its stipulated actual value exceeded $1,000 per share.
3. O'Neal, Restrictions on Tranferof Stock in Closely Held Corporations.:
Plan7dng & Drafting,65 H[nv. L. Rlv. 773, 780 (1952). Such restrictions may
be placed in articles of incorporation, in by-laws, or in restrictive agreements
-anong the shareholders or between them and the corporation. By the weight
of authority, reasonable by-law restrictions are, if invalid as by-laws, enforceable as valid contracts between the corporation and shareholders who acquired shares with knowledge of the by-laws or otherwise assented to them.
Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1951); Doss v. Yingling,
95 Ind.App. 494, 500-01, 172 N.E. 801, 803 (1930). See also Rommicu, ORGANI=G ComwoRATE AND OTm
Busnrms NERnmsn s 117 (3d ed. 1958);
44 CoRNm L.Q. 133, 135 (1958).
4. See 2 O'NEALr, CLosu ConponATioNs § 7.02 (1958); Cataldo, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L. REv. 229, 252
(1951); O~eal, supra note 3; Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictionw: Continuing Uncertainties and a Legislative Proposal,6 Vim. L. Rnv. 48 (1960); Symposium- The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. UL. lRv. 345, 382 (1957).
5. See 2 ONEAI, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.06; Painter, supra note 4, at
48-54 & 49 n.3; cf. 44 CoR-mi L.Q. 133, 134 (1958).
6. See 26 VA. L. Rxv. 354, 361 (1940).
7. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill.
App. 414, 4-20 (1924);
Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932); Moses v.
Soule, 63 Mic- 203, 118 N.Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1909); 2 ONnAL, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 7.02; O'Neal, supra note 3, at 773-75; 26 VA. L. Rnv. 354, 36162 (1940). See also Symposium-The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REv.
345 -(1957).
8. See 2 OEAI, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.06 & n.18. In permitting the
restraint, courts have generally reasoned that such arrangements do not pre-
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in effect requires a showing that the facts of a particular case
justify overriding the policy against restraintsf
Despite the large volume of litigation over first-option restrictions, 10 the effect of a nominal first-option price has not been
examined." It has long been recognized in regard to real property that the practical degree of restraint on alienation of a firstvent the ultimate alienation of the stock but merely pose an initial step in
a contemplated sale, that of offering the shares to the optionees for the stipulated price. See, e.g., Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 843, 162
AUt. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me.
34, 38, 145 Atl. 891, 393 (1929).
The enforceability of the option restraint, assuming it is valid, also depends on a number of variables: whether it appears in the by-laws, articles,
or shareholders' contract, the identity of the optionees, the terms of the option,
compliance with the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and the knowledge of transferees. See 12 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA or CORPORATIONS § 5457.1 (rev. ed.
1957); 44 Coimiai L.Q. 133, 139-42 (1958).
9. 12 FLtcHER, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 5455-57; 2 ONEAL, op. cit. upra
note 4, § 7.06; Cataldo, supra note 4, at 235-45; O'Neal, supra note 3, at 779;
87 U. PA. L. REV. 482, 483 (1939). Professor Painter has stated:
reasonableness as a criterion [of validity] seems to be little more than
a judicial determination to resolve each new situation in terms of prevailing equities and, in view of the almost endless variety of possible
restrictions and the infinite number of situations in which they may
be applied, there is little to guide an attorney in advising his client concerning the validity of particular restrictions.
Painter, supra note 4, at 60.
In the determination of reasonableness the following criterion have been
considered significant: (1) size of the corporation, People ex rel. Rudaitis v.
Galskis, 233 Il. App. 414, 420 (1924); (2) degree of restraint, People ez Tel.
Malcolm v. Lake Sand Corp., 351 Ill. App. 499, 504 (1929); (3) duration of
restraint, Tracey v. Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A.2d 780 (Ch. 1948), aff'd,
31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1949); (4) method of determining option
price, Security Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, 251 Ala. 508, 510, 38 So. 2d
274, 276 (1949); (5) expeditious to attaining corporate objectives, Lawson
v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 352, 152 AtI. 723, 727 (Sup. Ct.
1930); (6) possibility that hostile shareholders would injure corporation, People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, supra at 420; (7) purpose and duration, Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 254 (WID. Ky.
1962).
10. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958); Annot., 188 A.L.R. 647 (1942);
Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930).
11. Several price standards have been upheld, including book value, par
value, appraisal value, original issue price, an arbitrary figure agreeable to
the parties, and an outsider's offer price. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191
F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951) (intricate formula); Evans v. Dennis, 203 Ga. 232.
46 S.E.2d 122 (1948) (par value plus 10%); Hollister v. Fiedler, 30 N.J. Super.
203, 104 A.2d 61 (App. Div. 1954) (book value); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue
Corp., 2 N.Y2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957) (original issue
price). For discussions of valuation methods and the advantages and disadvantages of each, see 2 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.24; Page, Setting the
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option agreement varies inversely with price, the lower the price

below actual value the greater the restraint. - A few cases and
commentators have stated that this reasoning is equally applicable to shares of stock.' 3 The holding of the instant case, that a
enforceable, may
nominal option price agreement is valid and
4

have significant implications on this question.'
The instant court directed its attention to the maturity and
familial relationship of the parties, the fact that the stock was
closely held, and the clear and lawful purpose of the agreement, 3
particularly stressing the absence of fraud or overreaching. The
only consideration given to the nominal price was the court's rejection of the defendant's "fair and flexible" price contention"0
and -the court's ruling that the restriction was not absolute but
limited, for the stock could be sold publicly without restrictions
if the optionees rejected the offer.
a Close CorporationBuy-Sell Agreement, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 055 (1959);
Stern, Determination of Price in Close Corporation Stock Purchase Arrangements, 13 RuTGEnS L. 1rv. 293 (1958).
12. See 6 Am= cA LAw or PRoPERTY §§ 26.65, .67 (Casner ed. 1952);
PowxL,, LAw or RLn PRoPERTY § 842 (1958); Sparks, Future Interests, 32
N.Y.U,. 1Ev. 1434, 1440 (1957); cf. Kerslmer v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619
(Mo. 1955); Missouri State Highway Comnm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1958).
13. See Page, supra note 11. See also Greene v. E. H. Rollins &Sons, Inc.,
2e2 Del. Ch. s94,2 A2d 249 (Ch. 1938) where the court stated that "no distinction is to be drawn in this matter of unreasonable restraints upon alienation,
between real estate and personalty." Id. at 403, 2 Aod at 53.
14. The court found no Pennsylvania precedent other than cases recognizing the validity and enforceability of first-option agreements. See, e.g., Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909). Alien v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 584, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y..2d 418 (1957),
furnished the court's only direct authority. That case granted specific performance of a first-option restriction stipulating that the option price equal
the original issue price. Against the claim that the price was unfair and that the
restraint therefore was unreasonable and void, the court declared that "the
validity of the restriction on transfer does not rest on any abstract notion of
intrinsic fairness of price. To be invalid, more than mere disparity between
option price and current value . .. must be shown.' Id. at 543, 141 N-.Rd
at 817, 161 N.YS.2d at 424. It was then held that where parties agree on a
suitable price and make a provision freeing the stock for outside sale if the
option is refused, The restriction is reasonable and valid. For a criticism of the
Allen case as "weak precedent," see Sparks, supra note 12, at 1440, 1441.
15. Several Pennsylvania cases have held that restrictions on stock transfer serve "useful, lawful and enforceable purposes." See, e.g., Garvin's Estate,
335 Pa. 540, 6 A.2d 796 (1939); Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39
Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
16. Appellant argued that typical first-option agreements attempt at least
roughly to reflect the value of the shares and that fixed prices must be variable to allow for changes in value over time. Where the price is both unvaryPrice in
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In finding the restriction limited, the court ignored the actual
effect of the nominal option price. To reason that an agreement
requiring stock to be offered for a minute fraction of its value is
limited because the stock may be publicly sold if the offer is rejected, unrealistically ignores that the nominal price insures that
the offer will probably not be made and that if made, never rejected. Certainly the right to sell property at a small percentage
of its value is no practical alternative to its continued retention.
Under these circumstances, the effect of the agreement was that
no stock could be sold during the lives of the parties without an
immediate forfeiture of a high percentage of its value.1 7
That a nominal option price agreement effects an almost absolute restraint does not dispose of its validity; the issue still unresolved is whether such a restriction on closely held stock is reasonable. Ultimately, that determination depends on whether the
public policies allowing restrictions on close corporate stock and
respecting the freedom to contract outweigh the policy against
restrictions on alienation. In balancing these conflicting considerations, the Pennsylvania court in the instant case stressed the absence of fraud or overreaching. Although such a limited inquiry
arguably ignores the policy against restraints on alienation,1 8 the
standard applied seems consistent with current judicial attitudes
towards such arrangements.19 Although the argument that a noming and nominal, he argued, the arrangement is invalid. If this argument is
"unrealistic and utterly devoid of merit," as the court contended, the reason
must be that price need not be closely related to the stock value. If an option
price were required to reflect accurately current stock value, flexibility would
be indispensable. The court, in sustaining the validity of the one dollar price
agreement on $50 shares and enforcing it when they were worth (by stipulation) over $1,000, must have concluded that actual value was irrelevant.
17. Justice Cohen, in dissent, maintained that the nominal price agreement created an absolute and unreasonable restraint because it provided for
a price that was unvariable and unconscionably nominal in relation to the
value of the shares at the time the arrangement was made. Instant case at
372, 189 A.2d at 592. The usefulness of this analysis is questionable in light
of cases that uphold unvariable price formulas such as par value, original
stock value, and arbitrary fixed values. See cases cited note 11 supra. Since
the issue in these cases is whether the existence of a price disparity effects
an unreasonable restraint, when the price disparity arises does not seem important. But see 49 VA. L. REv. 1211, 1215 (1963).
18. See 49 VA. L.REv. 1211, 1215 (1963).
19. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532, 539-41 (1951), in
which the court, in granting specific performance of a first-option stock agreement, rejected defendant's unfair price contentions, announcing that utmost
freedom of contract must not be lightly interfered with. The court held that
where there exists a disparity between option price and current value of the
stock, that "difference must be so great as to lead to a reasonable conclusion
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inal option price works a forefeiture is appealing, it would not
seem particularly necessary or desirable for courts to "protect"
closely held shareholders or their heirs by determining that, as a
matter of law, a fair or reasonable price is an essential element
to the validity of an option agreement. Courts are in no better
position than good faith parties to establish "fair" price terms.
And, since closely held shares rarely have any ascertainable market value, almost every option contract would be open to litigation on the validity of the agreed-upon price. This, in effect, would
frustrate one of the objectives of the option agreement, the elimination of future price controversies." The same considerations
that underlie the courts' adamant refusal to examine the wisdom
or adequacy of consideration for promises in other buy-sell contracts compel a similar approach to first-option agreements concerning closely held shares.2 '
Sound business reasons motivate close corporations and their
shareholders to impose transfer restrictions on their stock. By
definition the number of stockholders is few; they are usually intimately identified with management and carry on little if any
public trading of their stock. These shareholders generally receive
their investment return through salaries in remuneration for their
active participation as corporate officers and directors. Since they
are active, the success or failure of the venture usually depends
on their personal business acumen. Hence, restrictions are most
frequently employed to confine ownership of the corporation, and
the management which results from ownership, to a select few
talented persons, friendly to the existing policies and purposes of
the corporation.2 Where the death or withdrawal of a stockholder
is likely to have a disruptive effect on the business of a close corporation, the corporation or shareholders may wish to reduce the
possibly prohibitive burden of paying a fair price for the decedent's shares by providing for a nominal first-option price. By so
of fraud, mistak% or concealment in the nature of fraud" in order to render
the agreement unenforceable. Id. at 541. See also Allen v. Biltmore Tissue
Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.Qd 418 (1957) (validity of
such restrictions does not rest on intrinsic fairness of price).

20. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 NXE.2d 812, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957). See also 2 O'Ns, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.24.
21. A less liberal approach seems desirable for widely held shares, how-

ever, since free alienation is fundamental to their profitability. An option
price even slightly below the market value destroys the stock appreciation-

investment incentive, notwithstanding the fact that the imposition of option

formalities on a holder's right to sell is time consuming. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
22. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
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providing, the enterprise insures its capacity to control its stock
and eliminates the possibility that paying the actual value of the
shares will cause severe financial stress. 3
That the policy against restraints is of relatively minimal value
in regard to closely held shares may not be an unreasonable contention.2 4 Investors in such ventures usually receive their return
through salaries while the investment incentives for widely held
enterprises are dividends and stock appreciation. 5 As a result,
since widely held shares are marketed according to a rapidly fluctuating market price, their profitability depends on the holder's
capacity to shift his investments quickly according to market
conditions. On the other hand, closely held stock has no equivalent market; nor does its profitability as a rule depend on its
holder's ability to liquidate and reinvest. 20 Hence a restriction on
the alienability of widely held stock impairs an incident of ownership fundamental to its investment value, whereas a similar restraint on closely held shares has little or no such significance.2 7
23. The financial stability of the corporation may fluctuate rapidly.
Therefore it would not be wise for a business to contract to incur a future
obligation equal to the fair value of a large block of shares. The existence
and common use of life insurance on the lives of the shareholders mitigates
to some extent the rigors of paying the actual value for the decedent's interest; but the expense of such insurance may make it unavailable to close corporations. See Stern, supra note 11, at 802-05. On the other hand, the practical advantages to be derived from an inexpensive "buy out" may be offset
in some cases by the severity of the restraint imposed. A recognized goal of
restrictions on closely held shares is the confinement of share ownership to
select talented persons on the theory that since close corporate shareholders
are usually active in management, the success of the venture depends on
their business skill. Yet, the dissident director-shareholder, faced with the
choice of offering his stock for a nominal price if he wishes to liquidate his
investment, will probably remain with the business. In such a case a nominal option arrangement causes a dissatisfied, possibly hostile shareholder
within the enterprise, frustrating the restriction's purpose.
24. See 87 U. PA. L. REV. 482, 483 (1988); cf. Note, 68 YALE LJ. 773, 777
n.26 (1959) (theoretically the employee could contract away all his rights as a
shareholder); 44 CouNEt L.Q. 183, 134 (1958) (restrictions on stock might
be more severe than those with respect to other personal property and yet
should not be as broad as permissible restrictions on assignment of contract
rights).
25. See Symposium - The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. RV. 345,
346-47 (1957).
26. Ibid.

27. Because of the lack of a ready market, a holder's capacity to transfer
closely held shares is minimal. Since closely held ventures are managed by
their shareholders, however, a dissatisfied investor possessing an offsetting
measure of control has an alternative other than the liquidation of his interest and reinvestment elsewhere- he may seek to enhance his return through
his management position. See 87 U. PA. L. REV. 482, 483 (1938). His oppor-
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However, since little less than the absolute prohibition on alienation invariably condemned as against public policy may be created by a nominal option agreement, its validity is at best a close
question and should be decided with particular attention to the
facts of each case.

Federal Taxation: Contestant Not Taxable on
Prize Where Contest Rules Required Assignment
Petitioner entered a scholarship contest" and designated his
daughter as the recipient of any prize awarded his entry. The

contest rules limited prize recipients to children under 17 years

one month old. 2 Petitioner's entry won an annuity that was pay-

able without restriction on its use when the designated recipient
attained age 18. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed

petitioner for income taxes on the present value of the annuity

because ,he had "earned" it by writing the winning essay. The
Tax Court held, seven judges dissenting,3 that the prize did not
constitute income to petitioner because he had no right to receive
it. PaulA.Tesehner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962).
Prior to the enactment of section 74 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, the taxability of prizes and awards was somewhat
uncertain. If the taxpayer's efforts won the contest prize, it was
taxable income; 4 if winning was fortuitous, the prize was contunity for such "self-help" is of particular value where he possesses a veto
power through a .unanimous or high-vote requirement for board of director
action. See Symposium- The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345,
380-86, 401-02 (1957).
1. The contest was the "Annual Youth Scholarship Contest" sponsored
by Johnson & Johnson, Inc., and consisted of writing an essay of not more
than fifty words on "A good education is important because .... " The
fourth-place prize won by the taxpayer's entry was a 81500 annuity payable
when the recipient attained age 18. The Commissioner contended that the
present value of the annuity ($1287.12) should be included in the petitioner's
income.
2. Rule 4 of the contest provided:
Only persons under age 17 years and 1 month (as of May 14, 1957)
are eligible to receive the policies for education. A contestant over that
age must designate a person below the age 17 years 1 month to receive
the policy for education. In naming somebody else, name, address and
age of both contestant and designee must be filled in on entry blank.
3. The Tax Court split eight to seven, with two concurring judges ineluded in the majority.
4. Robertson v. United States, 843 U.. 711 (1952) (prize for best unpublished symphonic work); United States v. Amirikian, 197 F.-d 442 (4th Cir.
1952) (best workable idea in arc welding); Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494 (1950)
(best detailed plan for postwar employment).
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sidered a nontaxable gift to the contestant.' Section 74 expressly
includes these items within the definition of gross income' in section 61(a) of the 1954 Code. Since section 74 does not provide
guidelines for determining who should be taxed when prizes or
awards are assigned, presumably the judicially established standards governing the assignment of income should be utilized.
Courts have traditionally scrutinized intra-family assignments
of income to prevent tax avoidance.' In Lucas v. Earl' the Supreme Court declared that the import of the tax code was to "tax
5. Glenn v. Bates, 217 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1954) (car giveaway); McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 i(D.C. Cir. 1945) .(essay contest); Ray
W. Campeau, 24 T.C. 370 (1955) (phone contest). See generally Rapp, Some
Recent Developments in the Concept of Taxable Income, 11 TAx L. Rzv. 329,
336-38 (1956); Soll, Essay Competitions and Income Tax Contests, 6 Tax L.
Rnv. 109 (1950).
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 74 provides:
(a) Gsnnxz RULE -Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 117 (relating to scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income
includes amounts received as prizes and awards.
(b) ExcrirmoN - Gross income does not include amounts received as
prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement....
Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a) (1955) specifically covers the scholarship contest in
the instant case by providing that amounts received "from radio and television giveaway shows, door prizes, and awards in contests of all types," arc
includible in gross income.
7. The minimization of family taxes is normally achieved by a transfer
of income from a family member in a high tax bracket to one in a lower
bracket. In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940), the Supreme
Court reasoned that intra-family transactions must be closely scrutinized
"lest what is in reality but one economic unit be multiplied into two or more
by devices which . . . are not conclusive as far as . . . [§ 61(a)] is concerned." Accord, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1947); Commissioner
v. Tower, 827 U.S. 280 (1946); Anderson v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 870 (7th
Cir. 1948); Ray Harroun, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 780 (1945). For a general discussion of the problem of intra-family assignments for tax purposes, see 2
MERTENS, LAW oF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 18.02 (rev. ed. 1961); Rice,
Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments To Avoid Federal Income Taxes,
64 YAE L.J. 991 (1955).
8. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The Lucas case was decided before the enactment
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013 which allows a husband and wife to file a
joint return on all family income. The enactment of § 6013 made it unnecessary for a taxpayer to assign anything to his wife to escape taxation. However, income-splitting arrangements with other members of the taxpayer's
family are still objectionable. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940);
Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945).
In Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), the Supreme Court held the
assignor taxable on life insurance contract renewal premiums that he had
assigned to his wife, thus rejecting the idea that Lucas applied only to assignments of future income. Rice, supra note 7, at 991.
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salaries to those who earned them."9 In order to give effect to
that purpose, the courts have experimented with a number of
tests designed to identify situations that do not warrant recognition of intra-family assignments for tax purposes. The difficulty
with which these tests are applied to differing situations, however, has limited the predictability of income tax consequences
of intra-family assignments.
Among the tests that courts have utilized is the "flow of satisfactions" 10 test, which justifies the imposition of the income tax
where the taxpayer retains a material, or even a nonmaterial,
satisfaction after a transfer of his right to income 1 The difficulty
in applying this test is illustrated by the Supreme Court's rejection of the Commissioner's argument, based on this test, in HelO 2 In Stuart the taxpayer placed money in a trust
vering v. Stuart.
9. The language of Mr. Justice Holmes, articulating this position, has
become the basic statement of policy in this area:
But this case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns
on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is
no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them
and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who
earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and
we think that no distinction can be taken according to the motive8 leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930). (Emphasis added.) This language
formed almost the entire basis for the dissenting opinion in the instant case.
Interestingly, the italicized phrase was the basis for one commentator's pronouncement that: "the metaphor has been substituted for rational analysis
by courts and commentators to the point where a critic in this area frequently
cannot see the forest for the fruit trees." Rice, supra note 7, at 991.
10. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
11. The Court in Helvering v. Horst stated:
The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment
and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and
uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes
of his right to collect it as the means of procuring them....
Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to
procure a satisfaction ... would seem to be the enjoyment of the
income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the comer
grocery, the payment of his debt there, or such nonmaterial satisfactions as may result from the payment of a campaign or community
chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son ....
The enjoyment
of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of his acquisition of
the coupons is realized as completely as it would have been if he had
collected the interest in dollars and expended them for any of the
purposes named.
Id. at 117.

12. 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
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for his son, and the Commissioner sought to tax the trust income
to the taxpayer, arguing that the trust satisfied the normal desire of a parent to provide for his child. Although the Court rejected this argument, a strict interpretation of the "flow of
satisfactions" test supports the Commissioner's position. The
Court's failure in Stuart to distinguish adequately the "flow of
satisfactions" test hinders predictability regarding its application. 3 For example, application of this test to the instant case
would require that the petitioner be taxed, for he enjoyed the
satisfaction of providing his daughter with the opportunity to
receive an annuity. Indeed, wherever an assignment is made some
satisfaction probably flows to the assignor; otherwise, the transfer would not likely have occurred. Thus, although this test occasionally has been used, 4 its broad scope virtually destroys its
utility.
Another test invoked by the courts to determine whether to
tax the assignor of an interest characterizes that interest as either
nontaxable "property"'1 or taxable "income.""' This test is easily
applied where, for example, the property interests assigned are
real estate17 and the income interests are wages,' 8 but between
13. See Rice, rupra note 7, at 994-95.
14. See, e.g., Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952); Acer
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942).
15. The Supreme Court, in Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), held
that an assignor of property was not liable for income taxes on income accruing from the property subsequent to the assignment, since he was not the

owner of the property when the income accrued. The property in that case

was a portion of the income interest of a trust. Using the Blair case as sup-

port, the courts have upheld assignments of many kinds of property, including: stock, Estate of Bertha May Holmes, 1 T.C. 508 (1943); annuities, Pearce
v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942); trust rights, Commissioner v. Bateman,
127 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1942); Herbert L. Dillon, 32 B.T.A. 1254 (1935); H. C.
Priester, 33 B.TA. 230 (1935); Emil Frank, 27 B.T.A. 1158 (1933); personal
property, Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (1oth Cir. 1951); and
royalty rights, Julius E. Lilienfeld, 35 B.T.A. 391 (1937); John F. Canning, 2)
B.T.A. 99 (1933).
16. In 2 MERTFNS, op. cit. supra note 7, § 18.02, the rule is stated that
It should be noted that in the Horst case the Court emphasized
the distinction between income subsequently earned on property previously acquired by the assignee, such as rent from a lease or a crop
raised on a farm after the leasehold or the farm had been transferred,
and the separate transfer of the right to interest or wages previously
accrued or earned....
See Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v.
Pierce, 137 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1943); Julius E. Lilienfeld, 35 B.TNA. 391
(1937); Beck, Assignments of Income From Inventions: Tax Minimization, 2
RUTGERS L. REv. 221 (1948).
17. See Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1945).
18. See Strauss v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948); Lewis v.
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these extremes it is almost unworkable. 9 In the instant case the
property-income test logically could have yielded either of two
results, depending upon the starting point. If the right to receive
income from the contest entry had been defined to be "property,"
which some courts have done with patent and copyright licenses,20
petitioner should not have been taxed because he relinquished
his entire interest. Since his daughter possessed the sole right to
receive the prize she should have been taxed as the owner of
income-producing property. On the other hand, if the right to
receive the prize had been viewed as a right to compensation for
the contestant's services, similar to a chose in action, then this
should have been considered an assignment of income, rendering
petitioner taxable on the annuity received by his daughter.2
A third test utilized by the courts in intra-family assignment
cases is taxation of the "earner"; this was the Commissioner's
theory in the instant case.2 2 The Commissioner argued that the
prize should constitute taxable income to the petitioner because
Rothensies, 61 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), af'd, 150 F2d 959 (3d Cir.
1945); Ray Harroun, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 780 (1945); W. L. Shore, 26
B.T.A. 389 (1932); Beck, supranote 16.
19. The cases upholding assignments of property are based on the idea
that the taxpayer has divested himself of all rights in the property in question including the right to receive income. See Julius E. Lilienfeld, 35 B.T.A.
391 (1937); cf. Rev. Rul. 599, 1954-2 CUm!. BuLL. 52; Beck, supra note 16.
In order for the assignment to be effective, however, the taxpayer must completely divest himself of control over the particular right in question. See
Henry J. Taylor, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 843 (1947); Ray Harroun, 4 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 780 (1945). Using this reasoning, the courts have upheld as.signments of royalties, Julius E.Lilienfeld, 35 B.T_. 391 (1937), and copyrights, John F. Canning, 29 B.T.A. 99 (1933). This test makes it very difficult to predict the result of a particular assignment. Two cases involving
assignments of rights in stories written by P. G. Wodehouse are illustrative.

In both cases the taxpayer assigned rights in stories that he had written
before he had sold them to the publisher. In the first case the Second Circuit
held that since he completely assigned these rights before he had the right
to receive income, the assignment should be given effect for tax purposes.
Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1949). However, the
Fourth Circuit, in a case involving identical assignments of different stories,
held that the assignments could not be given effect for tax purposes since
the stories merely represented the taxpayer's right to compensation for work
that he had performed. Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 Fad 987 (4th Cir.
1949).
20. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Commissioner, 89 Fad 243 (3d Cir. 1937); Morris
Cohen, 15 T.C. 261 (1950); Rice, supra note 7, at 100203.
21. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
22. The Commissioner proposed the rule that whenever A receives something of value attributable to services performed by B, the earner, B, is the
proper taxpayer. This rule was formulated in Rev. Rul. 127, 1958-1 Cum.
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he wrote the winning entry and he also had the power to designate the beneficiary. The majority of the Tax Court, by basing
their decision on the definition of "earn" and on the fact that
petitioner had no "right" to receive the annuity, failed to meet
the Commissioner's argument. That the petitioner earned the
prize, in the sense that his efforts produced the income, seems
clear. Nevertheless, the question presented is whether his assignment of that income was effective to shift the tax burden.
From a factual viewpoint,2- the instant court, even though
couching its decision in terms of "earnings," reached the correct
result. Nonrecognition of intra-family assignments is primarily to
prevent tax avoidance. 24 Arguably, since the contest rules required all contestants over 17 years old to designate a recipient, no device or scheme to avoid taxes was involved in the instant case.2 5 Even though the effect of not taxing petitioner
undoubtedly results in a lower tax on the prize, that petitioner's
motive in entering the contest was tax avoidance is doubtful.
Unlike the usual situation where the taxpayer is assured of producing income from his efforts, petitioner had only a remote posBuLL. 42, in which a taxpayer was held liable in a situation identical to the
instant case. See instant case at 1007.
28. Actually, an equitable factual analysis has been the basis of decision
in many intra-family assignment cases, with the traditional tests merely providing labels for the result. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260 (1958); Commissioner v. Tower, 827 U.S. 280 (1946); Harrison v.
Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Clifford, 809 U.S. 31 (1940);
Winters v. Dallman, 238 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1956).
24. Mr. Justice Stone's statement of this reasoning has become a touchstone for determining the validity of intra-family assignments for tax
purposes:
The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment
and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses
the income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of
his right to collect it as the means of procuring them.
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940).
Good motives are not necessary to uphold an assignment for tax purposes. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864, 871 (6th
Cir. 1957). However, the taxpayer's motives have been a factor considered
by the courts in determining the validity of assignments. In Commissioner
v. Bateman, 127 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1942) the court cited, in holding the
settlor not taxable on trust income, the fact that the taxpayer's motive could
not possibly have been tax avoidance since the trust was established in 1904,
well before the enactment of the sixteenth amendment. See also Visintainer
v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1951).
25. The petitioner was required by the contest rules to assign the prize.
See note 2 supra. In addition, the remote possibility of a particular individual winning the contest virtually eliminates the assignment as a "gimmick"
by the sponsors to encourage entries.
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sibility of submitting a winning entry. Therefore, it is more
probable that he never considered the tax consequences of his
entry.
Besides being cast in terms of the "earnings" test, another
criticism of the instant decision is that the Tax Court's language'6
supports nontaxability of an assignor merely because he was never
entitled to receive compensation for his services. "7 This result
should obviously not be permitted, because of the ease with which
an employee could evade income taxes simply by directing his
employer to pay future earnings to a member of the employee's
family. 5 The implications of the instant case, however, would
perhaps be better viewed as nontaxability of the assignor where
an independent third party instigates the bar to the assignor's
receipt of the prize. 9 Since the petitioner had no part in drafting
the contest rules and since presumably the rule that required
petitioner to assign did not induce him to enter this particular
contest, a third-party test is satisfied. Moreover, this standard is,
at least arguably, supported by prior Supreme Court decisions?0
26.
Certainly, it was [petitioner's] effort that generated the income,
to whomever it is to be attributed. However, as we have found, he
could not under any circumstances whatsoever receive the income so
generated himself. He had no right to either its receipt or its enjoyment. He could only designate another individual to be the beneficiary of that right.
Instant case at 1006.
27. See 1962 U. ILTa L.F. 663, 667.
28. A similar arrangement was successfully challenged by the Commissioner in J. H. M Ewen, 6 T.C. 1018 (1946). The Tax Court rejected a
scheme whereby part of the taxpayer's salary was paid to a trust for his
family. The court reasoned that this was simply another form of compensation since the arrangement was made at the request and under the direction
of the taxpayer.
29. One -problem with this proposed standard is the effect to be given to
a third party's setting up the arrangement as an inducement to the assignor
to act in a manner beneficial to the third party. For example, an employer
who, without any suggestion from the employee, requires that part of the
employee's wages be paid to a member of the employee's family could point
out to the employee that this arrangement would result in less taxes, increasing the disposable income of the employee's family. Such an involuntary
assignment should be recognized for tax purposes only upon a showing of a
minimal tax motive, relative to the non-tax reasons for the employer's setting up such an arrangement. This would prevent an employer from using
such a plan to induce an employee to work for him, rather than some other
employer, based on tax considerations.
30. In Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) the Supreme Court held that
the taxpayer's income should be treated as the joint income of him and his
wife because of their residence in a community property state. Thus, in
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In similar cases the courts have allowed taxpayers to assign
interests in lottery tickets to family members without the assignor incurring tax liability on the assignee's subsequent receipt
of a prize.' Generally, in lottery cases the Commissioner has attacked the validity of the assignment, rather than its effectiveness for tax purposes, since the slight value of the ticket makes a
tax-avoidance use of these assignments unlikely. The upholding
of these assignments, based on meager evidence of an assignment
actually having been made, 8 2 renders these situations more susceptible to manipulation for tax purposes than the facts of the
instant case. Thus, the seemingly well-established law in the
lottery-ticket assignment cases provides a strong argument in
favor of the result reached in the instant case.
Seaborn, even though the taxpayer made the decision to live in such a state,
and in the instant case, where the taxpayer decided to enter the contest, the
income-splitting effect was the result of something independent of the taxpayer, -the law of the state in Seaborn, and the sponsor's contest rule in the
instant case.
31. Freda Dowling, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 787 (1959); William Chelius,
17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 121 (1958); Max Silver, 42 B.TA. 461 (1940); Samuel L. Huntington, 35 B.T.A. 835 (1937); Christian H. Droge, 85 B.T.A. 829
(1987); A. L. Voyer, 4 B.T.A. 1192 (1926); accord, Rev. Rul. 638, 1955-2
Cum. BVLL. 35.
32. In William Chelius, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 121 (1958), proof of the
transfer was based on oral statements made by the assignor that a share
of the ticket belonged to her children and on a formal assignment drawn
up after the taxpayer was entitled to a sweepstakes prize. But see Harry J.
Riebe, 41 B.TA. 935 (1940), affd, 124 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1941) in whioh the
court refused to limit the taxpayer's liability since the evidence did not show
a valid transfer. See also Freda Dowling, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 737 (1959).

